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ABSTRACT
In the past eighteen months, the National Labor Relations Board
(“NLRB”) has received approximately one hundred charges from
employees that were disciplined or fired as a result of their work-related
online communications, principally through Facebook. These and other
charges have resulted in twenty-one NLRB Office of the General Counsel
Advice Memoranda, ten General Counsel reviews, four Administrative
Law Judge (“ALJ”) decisions, and one Board decision, all addressing
employee use of social media. This Article is the first to examine in detail
those employee charges and the thirty-six incidents addressed by the Office
of the General Counsel, the ALJs, and the Board. This Article’s analysis
reveals that, based on these charges and incidents, most employees are not
engaging online in concerted activities protected by the National Labor
Relations Act. Rather, for the most part, they are griping about work and
getting fired for it. However, these charges and incidents have raised
concerns over the enforcement of overly broad social media policies by
employers. Most importantly, the nature of social media technologies
raises new issues of unlawful employer surveillance that have yet to be
directly addressed by the NLRB. These three issues are examined through
this article: determining when employee online communications are
protected concerted activity, determining what constitutes an acceptable
social media policy, and determining when an employer might engage in
unlawful online surveillance.
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INTRODUCTION
With the continued growth of social media platforms, it was inevitable
that employees would voice their complaints about work online.
Employers may be inclined to discipline or even fire employees due to
online postings critical of the workplace. If, however, those online
postings constitute protected concerted activity, the National Labor
Relations Act1 (“NLRA” or “Act”) may prevent employers from taking any
disciplinary action. Between June 2009 and April 2011, the National Labor
Relations Board (“NLRB”) received approximately one hundred charges
from employees that were disciplined or fired due to online postings,
primarily on Facebook. Since late 2010, the NLRB has addressed thirty-six
situations involving employee online postings and employer social media
policies. This Article examines the analyses underlying thirty-two of those
incidents, highlighting situations in which employee online postings can
constitute concerted activity protected under federal law.
To establish the foundation for the forthcoming analyses, this Article
first provides an overview of what constitutes protected concerted activity
under section 7 of the NLRA. This Article then examines twenty-one
NLRB Office of the General Counsel Memoranda, seven additional
General Counsel reviews, four Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”)
decisions, and one Board decision.2 Application of these conclusions and
decisions are then applied in the context of employees complaining about
work online, primarily on Facebook. Three issues are examined in detail:
(1) exactly when an employee is engaged in protected concerted activity
when complaining online about work; (2) what is expected of employers in
fashioning social media policies so as to not unlawfully inhibit employee
concerted activities; and, (3) what subtleties lurk in the Facebook age with
regard to employer surveillance of employee online activities.

I.

SECTION 7 PROTECTED CONCERTED ACTIVITY
Section 7 of the NLRA protects concerted activity: It guarantees
employees the right to “engage in . . . concerted activities for the purpose
of . . . mutual aid or protection.”3 Section 7 is enforced by section 8(a)(1)
of the NLRA, which makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer to

1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2006).
2. Within this Article, activities by the NLRB generally, such as memoranda from the
Office of the General Counsel, will be identified with “NLRB.” Decisions by the NLRB’s
(usually) five-member quasi-judicial body will be identified as being by the “Board.”
3. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2006).
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“interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in section 157 of this title [section 7 of the NLRA].”4
The term “concerted activities” is not defined by the NLRA and has
been the subject of challenging interpretations and debate.5 In one of the
first interpretations of that term, the U.S. Supreme Court held that when
seven employees had, after numerous complaints, walked off the job
because their machine shop was too cold, they had engaged in protected
concerted activity.6 The Court concluded the workers’ walkout served as a
means for the “workers to act together to better their working conditions.”7
The Court also noted that the workers’ section 7 rights were especially
important in this case because they were “wholly unorganized;” “[t]hey had
no bargaining representative and, in fact, no representative of any kind to
present their grievances to their employer. Under these circumstances, they
had to speak for themselves as best they could.”8 This language has
subsequently been used to confirm that section 7 rights apply to nonunion
workplaces,9 particularly since those workers have no designated
bargaining representative.10
The NLRB, which enforces section 7,11 articulated its approach to
concerted activity in an August 2011 Advice Memorandum from the Office
4. Id. § 158(a)(1).
5. See Calvin William Sharpe, “By Any Means Necessary”—Unprotected Conduct
and Decisional Discretion Under the National Labor Relations Act, 20 BERKELEY J. EMP. &
LAB. L. 203, 204 (1999) (“The issue of how far unorganized and organized employees can
go in pressing legitimate claims has been controversial since the inception of the . . .
NLRA.”); see also Robert A. Gorman & Matthew W. Finkin, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW:
UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 396 (2d ed. 2004) (“Whether employee
activity falls within or without the shelter of section 7 is . . . a definitional issue of utmost
importance in the administration of the Act.”).
6. NLRB v. Wash. Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 14–18 (1962).
7. Id. at 14.
8. Id.
9. See William R. Corbett, Waiting for the Labor Law of the Twenty-First Century:
Everything Old Is New Again, 23 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 259, 278 (2002) (noting that
section 7 rights are not limited to employees represented by a union) (citing In re Epilepsy
Found. of Northeast Ohio, 331 N.L.R.B. 676 (2000), aff’d in part and rev’d in part sub nom.
Epilepsy Found. of Northeast Ohio v. NLRB, 268 F.3d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 2001), cert. denied,
536 U.S. 904 (2002)).
10. See Citizens Inv. Servs. Corp. v. NLRB, 430 F.3d 1195, 1197 (D.C. Cir. 2005)
(citing Wash. Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. at 14). Charles Morris has argued that while section
7 clearly applies in a nonunion setting, Congress intended it to apply to pre-organizational
activity—i.e., activity precursory to formal union organization. Charles J. Morris, NLRB
Protection in the Nonunion Workplace: A Glimpse at a General Theory of Section 7
Conduct, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1673, 1751 (1989). Morris further argues that the NLRB and
the courts should emphasize the strong nexus between traditional union activity and mutualaid-or-protection concerted activity to vindicate not only employment rights of individual
employees, but particularly public rights expressed by the NLRA. Id. at 1751–52.
11. See generally 29 C.F.R. §§ 101.1–101.43 (2011) (providing the procedures used in
investigating and prosecuting unfair labor practices).
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of the General Counsel: “An individual’s activity is concerted when the
individual acts ‘with or on the authority of other employees, and not solely
by and on behalf of the employee himself.’”12 In addition, “individual
activities that are the logical outgrowth of concerns expressed by the
employees collectively are considered concerted.”13 The Board has also
determined that “employee discussions related to shared concerns about
terms and conditions of employment constitute concerted activity even if
no specific group action is contemplated . . . .”14 In contrast, “comments
made solely by and on behalf of the employee himself are not concerted.”15
Finally, in order for the concerted activity to be protected, it must relate to
working conditions.16 In sum, “Congress conceived protected concerted
activity as a guarantee of the right of workers to organize and express
themselves freely . . . concerning their wages and working conditions.”17
II.

SOCIAL MEDIA POSTINGS AS PROTECTED CONCERTED ACTIVITY
While workers being fired or disciplined as a result of their online
postings is not a new phenomenon,18 such incidents had rarely been
12. Advice Memorandum from the NLRB Office of the Gen. Counsel to Cornele A.
Overstreet, Regional Director of Region 28, Sagepoint Financial, Inc., No. 28-CA-23441,
2011 WL 3793672, at *2 (Aug. 9, 2011) [hereinafter Sagepoint Fin. Adv. Mem.], available
at http://mynlrb.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/09031d45805fa7fd (citing Meyers Indus., 268
N.L.R.B. 493, 497 (1984) (Meyers I), rev’d sub nom. Prill v. NLRB, 755 F.2d 941 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 948 (1985), on remand Meyers Indus., 281 N.L.R.B. 882, 885
(1986) (Meyers II), aff’d sub nom. Prill v. NLRB, 835 F.2d 1481 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 487 U.S. 1205 (1988)); see also Hispanics United of Buffalo, Inc., Docket No. 3CA-27872, 2011 WL 3894520, at 7 (N.L.R.B. Div. of Judges Sept. 2, 2011), available at
http://mynlrb.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/ 09031d4580622877 (pagination based on
NLRB-source document). See infra note 29 (discussing Advice Memoranda).
13. Sagepoint Fin. Adv. Mem., supra note 12, at *2 (internal quotation marks omitted).
14. Sagepoint Fin. Adv. Mem., supra note 12, at *2 (internal quotation marks omitted)
(citing St. Margaret Mercy Healthcare Ctrs., 350 N.L.R.B. 203, 212 (2007), enforced sub
nom. St. Margaret Mercy Healthcare Ctrs., v. NLRB, 519 F.3d 373 (7th Cir. 2008)).
15. Sagepoint Fin. Adv. Mem., supra note 12, at *3 (internal quotation marks omitted)
(citing Meyers I, 268 N.L.R.B. at 497).
16. See, e.g., Advice Memorandum from the NLRB Office of the Gen. Counsel to
Richard L. Ahearn, Regional Director of Region 19, The Wedge Corp. d/b/a/ The Rock
Wood Fired Pizza & Spirits, No. 19-CA-32981, 2011 WL 4526829, at *3 (Sept. 19, 2011)
[hereinafter Rock Wood Adv. Mem.], available at http://mynlrb.nlrb.gov/link/document
.aspx/09031d4580681027 (“[W]hen employees engage in conduct to address the job
performance of their coworkers or supervisor that adversely impacts their working
conditions, their activity is protected.”).
17. Morris, supra note 10, at 1684. See infra Part III.A. (analyzing further the issue of
protected concerted activity).
18. See, e.g., Robert Sprague, Fired for Blogging: Are There Legal Protections for
Employees Who Blog?, 9 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 355, 357–58 (2007) (describing examples
of employees fired as a result of materials they had published online); Marc Cote, Note,
Getting Dooced: Employee Blogs and Employer Blogging Policies Under the National

FINAL DRAFT

2012]

FACEBOOK MEETS THE NLRB

961

addressed by the NLRB. In Fall 2007, an employee-union representative
was fired after posting a story on a union website critical of the employer’s
level of patient care.19 The Board determined the employee’s comments
were directly related to the impact of staffing levels on nurses’ terms and
conditions of employment.20 As such, the statements were a protected
concerted activity.21
For the next two years, it did not appear there was much concern with
whether employee online postings constituted protected concerted
activity,22 at least not until November 2009, when Dawnmarie Souza was
called into her supervisor’s office.23 Souza, a paramedic employed by
American Medical Response of Connecticut (“AMR”), was instructed by
her supervisor to write an incident report concerning one of the calls she
made on her shift, ostensibly because a complaint had been filed against
her by the husband of a woman Souza had treated. Souza requested that a
union representative be present before she would write the report. When

Labor Relations Act, 82 WASH. L. REV. 121, 122–23 (2007) (same). “Posting” refers to
publishing material online, whether on a blog, on a Facebook “wall,” or uploading a video
to YouTube. In contrast, when one publishes a message using Twitter, the act is referred to
as “tweeting” and the message is referred to as a “tweet.”
19. Valley Hosp. Med. Ctr., Inc. & Nevada Serv. Employees Union, Local 1107,
Affiliated with Serv. Employees Int'l Union., 351 N.L.R.B. 1250 (2007), enforced sub nom.
Nev. Serv. Emps. Union, Local 1107 v. NLRB, 358 F. App’x. 783 (9th Cir. 2009).
20. Id. at 1253.
21. See id. at 1254; see also Amcast Auto. of Ind., 348 N.L.R.B. 836, 838 (2006)
(deciding that an employee who had used a company computer during work hours to search
the Internet for information regarding a company rumored to be purchasing the employer
was not engaged in protected concerted activity, concluding “that the mere possibility of a
future sale was too speculative and remote for [the employee’s] Internet activity to be
protected under Section 7”); Endicott Interconnect Tech., Inc., 345 N.L.R.B. 448, 451
(2005) (deciding that a posting by an employee on an internet forum critical of his employer
was closely related to ongoing labor disputes and therefore protected under section 7),
vacated sub nom. Endicott Interconnect Tech., Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 453 F.3d 532, 537 (D.C.
Cir. 2006) (holding that the “disloyal, disparaging and injurious nature” of the employee’s
attacks on the company deprived him of protection under the Act). For a discussion of
disloyalty, see Matthew W. Finkin, Disloyalty! Does Jefferson Standard Stalk Still?, 28
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 541, 541 (2007) (arguing “that, at best, disloyalty is worthless
as a guide to decision; at worst, it chills speech of social value, and ought to be
abandoned”).
22. Though it was the subject of scholarly discussion; see, e.g., Rafael Gely & Leonard
Bierman, Social Isolation and American Workers, Employee Blogging and Legal Reform, 20
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 287 (2007); Katherine M. Scott, When Is Employee Blogging Protected
by Section 7 of the NLRA?, 2006 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 17 (2006); Cote, supra note 18.
23. See Advice Memorandum from the NLRB Office of the Gen. Counsel to Jonathan
B. Kreisberg, Regional Director of Region 34, American Medical Response of Connecticut,
Inc., No. 34-CA-12576 at 3-5 (Oct. 5, 2010) [hereinafter AMR Adv. Mem.], available at
http://mynlrb.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/09031d458055b9c4; see also Complaint and
Notice of Hearing, Am. Med. Response of Conn., Inc., No. 34-CA-12576 (N.L.R.B. Oct.
27, 2010).
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her request was denied, she refused to write the report. Later that evening,
Souza vented about the incident on her Facebook page, referring to her
supervisor as a “17” (a term used for psychiatric patients), a “dick,” and a
“scumbag.”24 Souza was subsequently fired, in part, for posting derogatory
remarks about her supervisor on Facebook.25
In fact, the NLRB began receiving complaints by employees, in the
form of “charges,”26 since at least June 2009; in all, the NLRB documented
approximately one hundred charges of unfair labor practices arising from
social media activities and policies between June 2009 and April 2011.27
While a majority of these charges have been closed with no action taken
beyond, perhaps, a cursory investigation,28 the NLRB’s Office of the
General Counsel has published twenty-one Advise Memoranda and
summarized ten additional situations,29 and four ALJ decisions and one
24. AMR Adv. Mem., supra note 23, at 3.
25. AMR Adv. Mem., supra note 23, at 5. For additional information regarding the
Souza incident, see infra Part II.B.
26. The complaint process is initiated by an employee (individually or through
representation) filing a charge with an NLRB Regional Office. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 101.1–
101.43 (detailing the filing and adjudication process). If the charge is determined to be of
merit or not settled or not withdrawn, the NLRB will file a formal complaint. 29 C.F.R. §
101.8. If the complaint is not settled, it will be heard before an ALJ, 29 C.F.R. § 101.10,
whose decision is filed with the Board, 29 C.F.R. § 101.11, which will either adopt, modify,
or reject the findings and recommendations of the ALJ, 29 C.F.R. § 101.10, 101.12(a). The
Board’s decision is subject to review by the federal circuit court of appeals. 29 C.F.R. §
101.14. The employee who files a charge is generically referred to as the “Charging Party.”
27. The author submitted a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request to the NLRB
seeking copies of “all charges, complaints, and completed settlements related to social
media.” In response, the NLRB sent a collection of documents, which included copies of
109 charges (ninety of which were filed by individual employees), nine complaints, and five
settlement agreements. The documents were readily available since, by coincidence, the
U.S. Chamber of Commerce had made an identical FOIA request just prior to the author’s
own request. See Michael J. Eastman, Exec. Dir. of Labor Law Policy, U.S. Chamber of
Commerce, A Survey of Social Media Issues Before the NLRB 2 (Aug. 5, 2011), available
at
http://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/reports/NLRB%20Social%20Media%20
Survey.pdf.
28. Through 2011, the majority of charges provided under the FOIA request had been
officially closed, and for most of the closed cases, it is unknown what occurred between the
filing of the original charge and the case being closed, i.e., the extent of any investigation,
whether the NLRB Regional Office where the charge was filed concluded it was without
merit, whether an informal agreement was reached between the employer and employee, or
whether the employee abandoned or withdrew the charge.
29. In certain types of cases involving novel and complex issues, the NLRB Regional
Director may be required to submit the case for advice from the NLRB’s Office of the
General Counsel before issuing a complaint. 29 C.F.R. § 101.8. In April 2011, the Office
of the General Counsel issued a memorandum requiring Regional Directors to submit for
advice “[c]ases involving employer rules prohibiting, or discipline of employees for
engaging in, protected concerted activity using social media, such as Facebook or Twitter.”
Memorandum from the NLRB Office of the Gen. Counsel to All Regional Directors,
Officers-in-Charge, and Resident Officers, Mandatory Submissions to Advice, No. GC 11-
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Board decision have been issued. These thirty-six incidents provide
excellent examples of the NLRB’s application of facts to its own definition
of protected concerted activity, as well as additional associated issues. The
analysis underlying each of the incidents and their respective
determinations is discussed below.30
A. Threatening to Withhold Patient Care
In June 2009, the senior management of a hospital became aware of
Facebook postings by three employees in which one of the managers
believed the employees were threatening to withhold care if they were
personally offended by patients.31 The employees were suspended with pay
pending a psychological exam, being formally advised their suspensions
were due to “disparaging written comments made by you regarding patients
and patient care that were brought to our attention.”32 The employees were
subsequently reinstated, though a memo was placed in each of their files
stating they had violated an Employee Behavior Policy.33
In response to charges that the employer had engaged in unfair labor
practices by disciplining the employees because of their Facebook
postings,34 the NLRB’s Office of the General Counsel concluded the
Facebook postings suggested those employees might not provide
appropriate care to the Employer’s patients and did not constitute protected
concerted activity.35 The employees also accused the employer of unlawful
11, 2011 WL 3348287, at *2 (Apr. 12, 2011), available at http://mynlrb.nlrb.gov/link/
document.aspx/09031d458047021e. Thirteen of the advice memoranda discussed in this
Article, as well as all four ALJ decisions and the one Board decision, address charges that
were included in the documents provided to this author by the NLRB. See supra note 27 for
a discussion of the documents provided by the NLRB referenced in this Article.
30. The incidents are discussed in the following order: first, advice memoranda (in
reverse chronological order of when they were issued); second, ALJ decisions (in reverse
chronological order of when they were issued); and, last, the one Board decision. Four
situations solely involving employer social media policies will be discussed in Part III.B.
infra.
31. Advice Memorandum from the NLRB Office of the Gen. Counsel to Director J.
Michael Lightner, Regional Director of Region 22, MONOC, No. 22-CA-29008, et al., 2010
WL 4685855, at *2 (May 5, 2010) [hereinafter MONOC Adv. Mem.] (redacting content of
actual postings in compliance Freedom of Information Act exemptions 6 and 7(c)),
available at http://mynlrb.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/09031d45803f7e3b.
32. MONOC Adv. Mem., supra note 31, at *2.
33. MONOC Adv. Mem., supra note 31, at *3.
34. NLRB Charge Against Employer, No. 22-CA-29008 (Nov. 16, 2009) (copy on file
with author).
35. MONOC Adv. Mem., supra note 31, at *5 (noting “[w]hile other postings on [one
employee’s] Facebook page clearly involved protected communications regarding terms and
conditions of employment and ongoing labor disputes, the specific comments cited by the
Employer as the basis of the employees’ suspensions did not involve Section 7 concerns and
were in no way related to the postings that did”).
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surveillance of their Facebook postings.36 In general, surveillance by an
employer can restrain employees from engaging in protected concerted
activities.37 However, “no impression of surveillance is created where the
employer explains that it obtained the information from other employees,
particularly in the absence of evidence that the employer solicited the
information.”38 Here, the managers obtained the Facebook postings from
another employee.39
B. Dawnmarie Souza Revisited
As discussed above, Dawnmarie Souza was fired by AMR, in part
because she posted disparaging remarks about her supervisor on
Facebook.40 Part of Souza’s dispute with her employer was that she was
denied union representation when she was ordered to write an incident
report.41 The NLRB’s Office of the General Counsel concluded that “the
written incident report constitute[d] an investigatory interview and that
Souza had a right to Union representation when completing the report.
Thus, the Employer violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by denying Souza a
Union representative and threatening to discipline her for invoking her
The General Counsel’s office further
[right to representation].”42
concluded that Souza was engaged in protected concerted activity when she
later discussed with her coworkers, via Facebook, her run-in with her
supervisor.43
One issue raised in considering Souza’s charge was whether she lost
NLRA protection by referring to her supervisor as a “17,” a “dick,” and a
“scumbag” in her Facebook post.44 The NLRA “protects statements made
during the course of protected conduct unless they are so egregious as to
36. NLRB Charge Against Employer, No. 22-CA-29008, supra note 34.
37. MONOC Adv. Mem., supra note 31, at *5 (“Employer surveillance or creation of
an impression of surveillance constitutes unlawful interference with Section 7 rights because
employees should feel free to participate in union activity ‘without the fear that members of
management are peering over their shoulders.’”) (citing Flexsteel Indus., Inc., 311 N.L.R.B.
257, 257 (1993)).
38. MONOC Adv. Mem., supra note 31, at *6.
39. See MONOC Adv. Mem., supra note 31, at *6 (noting the supervisor had informed
the holder of the Facebook profile that the posts were obtained by a “concerned” employee;
noting also that the holder of the Facebook profile had restricted access to her posts to her
“friends,” and therefore “would not reasonably conclude that the Employer was directly
monitoring her Facebook page”). See infra Part III.C. for a further discussion of employer
surveillance.
40. See supra notes 23–25 and accompanying text.
41. AMR Adv. Mem., supra note 23, at 3.
42. AMR Adv. Mem., supra note 23, at 6.
43. AMR Adv. Mem., supra note 23, at 9 (describing Souza’s protected concerted
activity as “discussing supervisory actions with coworkers in her Facebook post”).
44. AMR Adv. Mem., supra note 23, at 9; see also supra text accompanying note 23.
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remove the employee’s conduct from the protection of the Act.”45 Four
factors are considered when determining whether an employee who is
engaged in protected concerted activity has by “opprobrious” conduct lost
the protection of the Act: “(1) the place of the discussion; (2) the subject
matter of the discussion; (3) the nature of the employee’s outburst; and (4)
whether the outburst was, in any way, provoked by an employer’s unfair
labor practice.”46 The General Counsel’s office concluded Souza’s conduct
was not so opprobrious as to lose the protection of the Act: first, the
Facebook postings did not interrupt the work of any employee because they
occurred outside the workplace and during the nonworking time of both
Souza and her coworkers; second, the comments were made during an
online employee discussion of supervisory action, which is protected
activity; third, Souza’s name-calling was not accompanied by any verbal or
physical threats; and fourth, Souza’s Facebook postings were provoked by
her supervisor’s unlawful refusal to provide her with a union representative
for the completion of the incident report and by his unlawful threat to
discipline her.47
The NLRB’s Office of the General Counsel also determined that
AMR’s Internet and Blogging Policy, which prohibited employees from
“making disparaging . . . comments when discussing the Company or the
employee’s superiors, co-workers, and/or competitors,” was unlawful
because it contained no limiting language to inform employees that it did
not apply to section 7 activity.48 The NLRB settled this matter with AMR,
in which AMR agreed to post a notice to its employees that it was revising
its Internet and Blogging Policy, acknowledging that it improperly
restricted its employees’ “right to engage in union activities or to discuss
[their] wages, hours and working conditions with [their] fellow employees
and others while not at work.”49
C. Tweeting About Union Negotiations
Contemporaneous with union negotiations over bonuses and other
benefits, Thomson Reuters (“Reuters”) launched a “Destination Reuters”

45. AMR Adv. Mem., supra note 23, at 9 (citing Atlantic Steel Co., 245 N.L.R.B. 814,
816 (1979)).
46. AMR Adv. Mem., supra note 23, at 9 (citing Atlantic Steel Co., 245 N.L.R.B. at
816).
47. AMR Adv. Mem., supra note 23, at 9–10.
48. AMR Adv. Mem., supra note 23, at 13 (internal quotation marks omitted). See
infra Part III.B., for a further discussion of the lawfulness of employer social media policies.
49. NLRB Settlement Agreement, No. 34-CA-12576 (Feb. 7, 2011), available at
http://www.minnesotaemploymentlawreport.com/NLRB%20Facebook%20Settlement.pdf.
Interestingly, the fate of Souza—i.e., whether she was to be reinstated and/or to receive back
pay—is not mentioned in the settlement agreement.
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Twitter feed which employees were invited to follow and to “join the
conversation as we Tweet on major media play on Reuters and the
competition, journalism awards and tips to help you manage your career
better at Reuters.”50 At the same time, Reuters also issued Social Media &
Online Communication Guidelines (“Guidelines”) and a Handbook of
Journalism (“Handbook”) “to regulate employees’ online participation,
including in blogs and social sites like Facebook and Twitter.”51 A Reuters
reporter replied to the “Destination Reuters” Twitter feed announcement by
sending a tweet stating that “one way to make this place the best place to
work is to deal honestly with Guild members.”52 The next day, the
journalist’s bureau chief called to “remind” the reporter that the Company’s
Twitter policy prohibited tweeting anything that “would damage the
reputation of Thomson Reuters” and that her tweet implied that the Reuters
was not dealing honestly with the union.53
The NLRB’s Office of the General Counsel concluded that
maintenance of the Guidelines and portions of the Handbook, as well as the
application of the Twitter policy to the journalist’s tweet exhorting Reuters
to “deal honestly with Guild members” violated section 8(a)(1).54 While
Reuters’s social media policy did not explicitly prohibit section 7 activity,
the General Counsel’s office considered the Guidelines and portions of the
Handbook to be unlawful because they would reasonably be construed to
apply to section 7 activity that may be critical of Reuters, but is nonetheless
protected.55 For example, the Guidelines and the Handbook prohibited
communications that “attack or insult[,]” or embarrass or disparage, or
“damage the reputation” of Reuters, or are “embarrassing to others.”56 The
General Counsel’s office considered these prohibitions as broad terms that
would commonly apply to protected criticism of an employer’s labor
policies or treatment of employees.57 It concluded:
Neither the Handbook nor the Guidelines define these broad
terms or limit them in any way that would exclude Section 7
50. Advice Memorandum from the NLRB Office of the Gen. Counsel to Karen
Fernbach, Acting Regional Director of Region 2, Thomson Reuters, No. 02-CA-39682,
2011 WL 6960026, at *5 (Apr. 5, 2011) [hereinafter Thomson Reuters Adv. Mem.],
available at http://mynlrb.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/09031d458079355f (internal
quotation marks omitted).
51. Thomson Reuters Adv. Mem., supra note 50, at *4.
52. Thomson Reuters Adv. Mem., supra note 50, at *5 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
53. Thomson Reuters Adv. Mem., supra note 50, at *5 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
54. Thomson Reuters Adv. Mem., supra note 50, at *14 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
55. Thomson Reuters Adv. Mem., supra note 50, at *15.
56. Thomson Reuters Adv. Mem., supra note 50, at *15.
57. Thomson Reuters Adv. Mem., supra note 50, at *15.
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activity. On the contrary, the Employer has actually applied the
broad language in its social media policies to restrict Section 7
activity, invoking its policy to reprimand an employee for the
protected exhortation to “deal honestly” with the Union.58
D. Tweeting that TV People Are Stupid
Brian Pedersen was a reporter with the Arizona Daily Star. In
response to an initiative by the Daily Star to encourage “reporters to use
social media to get news stories out to people who might not read the
newspaper and to drive readers to the Daily Star’s website[,]”59 Pedersen
attended a “webinar” about how to use Twitter and opened a Twitter
account.60 About a year later, Pederson posted a tweet stating: “The
Arizona Daily Star’s copy editors are the most witty and creative people in
the world. Or at least they think they are.”61 About two weeks later,
Pedersen was called into a meeting with his supervisors, who expressed
concern about his tweet and informed him he was “prohibited from airing
his grievances or commenting about the Daily Star in any public forum.”62
Approximately eight months later, over a period of four weeks, Pedersen
posted a series of tweets trivializing the Tucson-area homicide rate, and
calling “TV people” stupid in response to a misspelled word in a television
station’s tweet.63 Pedersen was subsequently fired because he disregarded
guidance “to refrain from using derogatory comments in any social media
forums that may damage the goodwill of the company,” and because of his
“inappropriate Twitter posting.”64
The NLRB’s Office of the General Counsel concluded Pedersen “was
terminated for writing inappropriate and offensive Twitter postings that did
not involve protected concerted activity.”65 In particular, Pedersen’s
“conduct was not protected and concerted: it did not relate to the terms and
conditions of his employment or seek to involve other employees in issues

58. Thomson Reuters Adv. Mem., supra note 50, at *15.
59. Advice Memorandum from the NLRB Office of the Gen. Counsel to Cornele A.
Overstreet, Regional Director of Region 28, Lee Enterprises, Inc., d/b/a/ Arizona Daily Star,
No. 28-CA-23267, 2011 WL 1825089, at *1 (Apr. 21, 2011) [hereinafter Daily Star Adv.
Mem.], available at http://mynlrb.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/09031d4580495256; see
also NLRB Charge Against Employer, No. 28-CA-23267 (Nov. 24, 2010) (copy on file with
author).
60. Daily Star Adv. Mem., supra note 59, at *1.
61. Daily Star Adv. Mem., supra note 59, at *2 (internal quotation marks omitted)
(noting that the tweet was in response to certain sports headlines).
62. Daily Star Adv. Mem., supra note 59, at *2 (internal quotation marks omitted).
63. Daily Star Adv. Mem., supra note 59, at *2–3.
64. Daily Star Adv. Mem., supra note 59, at *4.
65. Daily Star Adv. Mem., supra note 59, at *4.
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related to employment.”66 Although supervisors admonished Pedersen “to
stop airing his grievances or commenting about the Employer in any public
forum[,]” and “to refrain from using derogatory comments in any social
media forums that may damage the goodwill of the company”—which
could be interpreted as overly broad rules that prohibit protected concerted
activities—here, “the statements were made solely to the Charging Party
[Pedersen] in the context of discipline, and in response to specific
inappropriate conduct, and were not communicated to any other employees
or proclaimed as new “‘rules.’”67
E. When a Supervisor Complains About a Coworker
Kathleen Reichle and her fellow nurses were upset that another nurse
frequently missed her shifts, and although they had complained to their
manager, no action had been taken to rectify the matter.68 After the nurse
called in sick again, Reichle posted a comment on her Facebook page
complaining about the nurse, ending with: “Anymore details, contact
me.”69 Reichle was subsequently fired because she had “talked badly about
the hospital” in violation of the hospital’s social media policy.70
The Board considers an employer to have violated section 8(a)(1) of
the NLRA if it maintains a work rule that would “reasonably tend to chill
employees in the exercise of their Section 7 rights.”71 While a rule that
explicitly restricts section 7 activities is unlawful, so too can a rule that
implicitly restricts section 7 activities if one of three conditions is met: “(1)
employees would reasonably construe the language to prohibit Section 7
66. Daily Star Adv. Mem., supra note 59, at *5.
67. Daily Star Adv. Mem., supra note 59, at *5–6.
68. Advice Memorandum from the NLRB Office of the Gen. Counsel to Rochelle
Kentov, Regional Director of Region 12, Flagler Hospital, No. 12-CA-27031, 2011 WL
5115074, at *1 (May 10, 2011) [hereinafter Flagler Hosp. Adv. Mem.], available at
http://mynlrb.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/09031d45806bab9c; see also NLRB Charge
Against Employer, No. 12-CA-26947 (Nov. 16, 2010) (copy on file with author).
69. Flagler Hosp. Adv. Mem., supra note 68, at *1 (internal quotation marks omitted).
70. Flagler Hosp. Adv. Mem., supra note 68, at *2 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Reichle withdrew her original charge that she was fired in violation of the NLRA because
she was classified as a supervisor. Flagler Hosp. Adv. Mem., supra note 68, at *2. Section
7 applies to employees. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (“Employees shall have the right . . . to engage
in . . . concerted activities for the purpose of . . . mutual aid or protection”) (emphasis
added). And the NLRA’s definition of employee excludes supervisors. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3).
The General Counsel’s office concluded, however, that had she not been a supervisor,
Reichle’s postings would have clearly been protected concerted activity. Reichle
subsequently filed a new charge alleging that certain provisions of the hospital’s social
media policy were unlawful. Flagler Hosp. Adv. Mem., supra note 68, at *2.
71. Flagler Hosp. Adv. Mem., supra note 68, at *2 (citing Lafayette Park Hotel, 326
N.L.R.B. 824, 825 (1998), enforced sub nom. Lafayette Park Hotel v. NLRB, 203 F.3d 52
(D.C. Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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activity; (2) the rule was promulgated in response to union activity; or (3)
the rule has been applied to restrict the exercise of Section 7 rights.”72
The NLRB’s Office of the General Counsel concluded that three of
the hospital’s policies were unlawful. The hospital prohibited employees
from using any social media that “may in any way violate, compromise, or
disregard . . . the rights and reasonable expectations as to privacy or
confidentiality of any person or entity.”73 Since the hospital did not
provide a definition or guidance as to what it considers to be private or
confidential, the General Counsel’s office concluded the rule was overly
broad, in that it could reasonably be interpreted as prohibiting protected
employee discussion of wages and other terms and conditions of
employment.74
A second hospital rule prohibited the use of social media to post
“[a]ny communication or post which constitutes embarrassment,
harassment or defamation of the Hospital” or of “any employee, officer,
board member, representative or staff member.”75 The General Counsel’s
office noted that this particular rule was the one relied upon by the hospital
to fire Reichle because of her Facebook postings, which would have been
protected if she had been a statutory employee.76 As such, the hospital’s
“interpretation and application of that [rule] to cover the Charging Party’s
expression of frustration over a colleague’s conduct that frequently resulted
in heavier demands on the remaining staff could reasonably lead employees
to conclude that protected complaints about their working conditions are
prohibited.”77
The final rule considered by the NLRB’s Office of the General
Counsel prohibited “statements which lack . . . truthfulness or which might
cause damage to or does damage the reputation or goodwill of the Hospital
. . . .”78 The General Counsel’s office concluded this rule was ambiguous
because its terms could be applied to protected criticism of the hospital’s
labor policies or treatment of employees.79 In addition, this last rule
contained a savings clause, stating its prohibitions were limited to conduct
“or form of expression which, under the law, is or may be

72. Flagler Hosp. Adv. Mem., supra note 68, at *2 (citing Lutheran Heritage VillageLivonia, 343 N.L.R.B. 646, 647 (2004)).
73. Flagler Hosp. Adv. Mem., supra note 68, at *2 (internal quotation marks omitted).
74. Flagler Hosp. Adv. Mem., supra note 68, at *2
75. Flagler Hosp. Adv. Mem., supra note 68, at *3 (alteration in original) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
76. Flagler Hosp. Adv. Mem., supra note 68, at *3; see supra note 70 (discussing
Reichle’s lack of standing under section 7 because she was a supervisor and not an
“employee”).
77. Flagler Hosp. Adv. Mem., supra note 68, at *3.
78. Flagler Hosp. Adv. Mem., supra note 68, at *3 (internal quotation marks omitted).
79. Flagler Hosp. Adv. Mem., supra note 68, at *3.
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impermissible.”80 The Board has held that an employer may not prohibit
employee activity protected by the NLRA and then seek to escape the
consequences of the prohibition by a general reference to rights protected
by law.81 More specifically, the Board has explained that “these general
provisions, known as savings clauses or disclaimers, that employers tack
onto the end of a rule that otherwise prohibits, coerces, or restrains
employees in the exercise of their Section 7 rights, do not make an
otherwise unlawful rule lawful.”82
F. Complaining About Work on a U.S. Senator’s Facebook Wall
In January 2011, Lori Russell-Head, a dispatcher for a company that
provides emergency and nonemergency medical transportation and fire
protection services in Indiana, posted a message on Senator Dick Lugar’s
(R-IN) Facebook wall, complaining that she and her husband were
underpaid employees of a private contractor providing public services.83
Russell-Head claimed that “she wanted to make Senator Lugar aware that
she disagreed with how emergency medical services were handled in
Indiana and that her kind of company was not helping the current
situation.”84 Russell-Head was subsequently fired “for publicly posting
disparaging remarks about the Employer and confidential information
about its response to a service call[,]” and because her Facebook comments
violated the Employer’s Code of Ethics and Business Conduct policy.85
The NLRB’s Office of the General Counsel determined RussellHead’s firing was not unlawful because she did not engage in concerted
activity. She did not discuss her Facebook posting with any other
employee; there had been no employee meetings or any attempt to initiate
group action; she was not trying to take employee complaints to
management; and, admittedly, did not expect Senator Lugar to take any
action that would affect her employment situation.86 Rather, she was

80. Flagler Hosp. Adv. Mem., supra note 68, at *3. (internal quotation marks omitted).
81. Flagler Hosp. Adv. Mem., supra note 68, at *3; Tower Indus. Inc., d/b/a Allied
Mech., 349 N.L.R.B. 1077, 1084 (2007) (“An employer may not specifically prohibit
employee activity protected by the Act and then seek to escape the consequences of the
specific prohibition by a general reference to rights protected by law.”).
82. Flagler Hosp. Adv. Mem., supra note 68, at *3.
83. Advice Memorandum from the NLRB Office of the Gen. Counsel to Rik Lineback,
Regional Director of Region 25, Rural Metro, No. 25-CA-31802, 2011 WL 2960970, at *1
(June
29,
2011)
[hereinafter
Rural/Metro
Adv.
Mem.],
available
at
http://mynlrb.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/09031d458055fad2; see also NLRB Charge
Against Employer, No. 25-CA-31802 (Mar. 14, 2011) (copy on file with author).
84. Rural/Metro Adv. Mem., supra note 83, at *1.
85. Rural/Metro Adv. Mem., supra note 83, at *2.
86. Rural/Metro Adv. Mem., supra note 83, at *2.
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“merely trying to make a public official aware of the state of emergency
medical services in Indiana.”87
G. Discussing Tip Sharing with a Step-Sister
In February 2011, Bradley Denney, a bartender at JT’s Porch Saloon
& Eatery, engaged in a Facebook “conversation” with his step-sister.88 In
response to his step-sister’s inquiry as to how work was going, Denney
responded that he had not received a raise in five years and that he was
doing the waitresses’ work without tips; he also called the employer’s
customers “rednecks” and stated that he “hoped they choked on glass as
JT’s maintains an unwritten policy,
they drove home drunk.”89
communicated to bartenders when they are hired, that waitresses do not
share their tips with the bartenders even though the bartenders help the
waitresses serve food.90 Although Denney discussed the tip sharing policy
with another bartender and she agreed the policy “sucked,” they never took
their complaint to management; nor did any other coworkers participate in
the Facebook conversation between Denney and his step-sister.91 Two
months later, Denney was fired “for his Facebook posting about the
Employer’s customers.”92
The NLRB’s Office of the General Counsel concluded Denney was
not unlawfully fired because he did not engage in concerted activity:
Here, there is no evidence of concerted activity. Although the
Charging Party’s posting addressed his terms and conditions of
employment, he did not discuss his Facebook posting with any of
his fellow employees either before or after he wrote it, and none
of his coworkers responded to the posting. There had been no
employee meetings or any attempt to initiate group action with
regard to the tipping policy or the awarding of raises. There also
was no effort to take the bartenders’ complaints about these
matters to management. In this instance, the Charging Party was
merely responding to a question from his step-sister about how
87. Rural/Metro Adv. Mem., supra note 83, at *2.
88. Advice Memorandum from the NLRB Office of the Gen. Counsel to Gail R.
Moran, Acting Regional Director of Region 13, JT’s Porch Saloon & Eatery, Ltd., No. 13CA-46689, 2011 WL 2960964, at *1 (July 7, 2011) [hereinafter JT’s Porch Adv. Mem.],
available at http://mynlrb.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/09031d458055b9c6; see also
N.L.R.B. Charge Against Employer, No. 13-CA-46689 (Apr. 5, 2011) (copy on file with
author).
89. JT’s Porch Adv. Mem., supra note 88, at *1.
90. JT’s Porch Adv. Mem., supra note 88, at *1.
91. JT’s Porch Adv. Mem., supra note 88, at *1.
92. JT’s Porch Adv. Mem., supra note 88, at *1. Ironically, the day before he was
formally fired, the owner of JT’s Porch informed Denney that “his services were no longer
required” through a Facebook posting. JT’s Porch Adv. Mem., supra note 88, at *1.
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his evening at work went. And this internet “conversation” did
not grow out his prior conversation with a fellow bartender
months earlier about the tipping policy.93
H. Expressing Frustration with Wal-Mart
In October 2010, after an interaction with a new Assistant Manager,
Brian Morris, a Wal-Mart employee, posted on his Facebook page, “Wuck
Falmart! I swear if this tyranny doesn’t end in this store they are about to
get a wakeup call because lots are about to quit!”94 Two coworkers posted
short comments generally agreeing with Morris’s sentiments, and Morris
posted another comment criticizing the Assistant Manager.95 Morris was
subsequently disciplined for his Facebook postings.96 The NLRB’s Office
of the General Counsel concluded that Morris’s charge against Wal-Mart
should be dismissed because he did not engage in concerted activity; his
postings were merely “an expression of an individual gripe.”97
I.

Talking About Mentally Disabled Clients

In January 2011, an employee of Martin House, a nonprofit residential
facility for homeless people, engaged in a “conversation” on her Facebook
wall in which she stated it was “spooky” being all alone “in a mental
institution.”98 No coworkers were involved in the conversation; however, a
former client was Facebook friends with the employee and saw the posts
and reported them to the employer.99 The employee was subsequently fired
as a result of the Facebook posts.100 The NLRB’s Office of the General
Counsel concluded the employee’s firing was not unlawful because she had
not engaged in concerted activity.101 Not only were no coworkers involved
in the Facebook conversation, it did not even mention any terms or

93. JT’s Porch Adv. Mem., supra note 88, at *2.
94. Advice Memorandum from the NLRB Office of the Gen. Counsel to Daniel L.
Hubbel, Regional Director of Region 17, Wal-Mart, No. 17-CA-25030, 2011 WL 3223852,
at *1 (July 19, 2011) [hereinafter Wal-Mart Adv. Mem.], available at
http://mynlrb.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/09031d458056e73d; see also N.L.R.B. Charge
Against Employer, No. 17-CA-25030 (Dec. 9, 2010) (copy on file with author).
95. Wal-Mart Adv. Mem., supra note 94, at *1.
96. Wal-Mart Adv. Mem., supra note 94, at *1.
97. Wal-Mart Adv. Mem., supra note 94, at *2.
98. Advice Memorandum from the NLRB Office of the Gen. Counsel to Jonathan B.
Kresiberg, Regional Director of Region 34, Martin House, No. 34-CA-12950, 2011 WL
3223853, at *1 (July 19, 2011) [hereinafter Martin House Adv. Mem.], available at
http://mynlrb.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/09031d458056e73e.
99. Martin House Adv. Mem., see supra note 98, at *1.
100. Martin House Adv. Mem., see supra note 98, at *1.
101. Martin House Adv. Mem., see supra note 98, at *2.
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conditions of employment.102 The employee “was merely communicating
with her personal friends about what was happening on her shift.”103
J. Complaining About a Dispatcher
In December 2010, Gregory Crawford, a truck driver employed by
Buel, Inc., was stuck outside of Laramie, Wyoming, due to snow and was
unable to reach a dispatcher.104 He posted a complaint about his situation
on his Facebook page.105 Crawford was subsequently demoted, after which
he quit, claiming he was constructively discharged as a result of his
Facebook posting.106 The NLRB’s Office of the General Counsel
concluded that Crawford had not engaged in concerted activity.107 Rather
than collectively communicating with fellow employees regarding work
conditions, the General Counsel’s office concluded Crawford “was simply
expressing his own frustration and boredom while stranded by the weather,
by griping about his inability to reach the on-call dispatcher.”108
Crawford also accused his employer of surveillance of his Facebook
account.109 Here, Crawford had “friended” his supervisor on Facebook,
essentially inviting her to view his Facebook page.110 Further, there was no
evidence that the supervisor “was acting at the Employer’s direction or was
on Facebook for the sole purpose of monitoring employee postings.”111
K. Accusing a Supervisor of Having an Affair
In 2010, an employee of Sagepoint Financial, Inc., sent a number of
email messages and wrote several Facebook posts complaining about his
situation at work, namely, that his supervisor had been chosen over him for
a promotion, she had hired two incompetent employees, and suggesting
that she was having an affair with one of them.112 In Facebook posts, he

102. Martin House Adv. Mem., see supra note 98, at *2.
103. Martin House Adv. Mem., see supra note 98, at *2.
104. Advice Memorandum from the NLRB Office of the Gen. Counsel to Jane North,
Acting Regional Director of Region 11, Buel, Inc., No. 11-CA-22936, 2011 WL 3793671, at
*1
(July
28,
2011)
[hereinafter
Buel
Adv.
Mem.],
available
at
http://mynlrb.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/09031d45805fa7fc; see also N.L.R.B. Amend.
Charge Against Employer, No. 11-CA-22936 (Mar. 28, 2011) (copy on file with author).
105. Buel Adv. Mem., supra note 104, at *1.
106. Buel Adv. Mem., supra note 104, at *2.
107. Buel Adv. Mem., supra note 104, at *2.
108. Buel Adv. Mem., supra note 104, at *2.
109. N.L.R.B. Amend. Charge Against Employer, No. 11-CA-22936, supra note 104.
110. Buel Adv. Mem., supra note 104, at *3.
111. Buel Adv. Mem., supra note 104, at *3.
112. See Sagepoint Fin. Adv. Mem., supra note 12, at *1.
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stated that he hated his supervisor and called her a bitch.113 Although the
employee was initially Facebook friends with several coworkers and
supervisors, he subsequently “unfriended” most of his coworkers and
continued to vent online about his supervisor.114 The employee was
initially reprimanded and admonished to “conduct [himself] in a
professional manner; do not disrespect other employees or your
management team or make negative comments.”115 The employer
ultimately terminated the employee “for continual behavior problems and
his inability to interact with his coworkers and manager, referencing his emails and Facebook postings.”116
In concluding the employer did not unlawfully fire the employee
because he was not engaged in concerted activity,117 the NLRB’s Office of
the General Counsel stated:
Here, the Charging Party’s repeated Facebook complaints about
his supervisor and what he perceived to be her preferential
treatment of two coworkers were made solely on his own behalf
and were not designed to advance any cause other than his own.
Moreover, he did not evidence any intention of instigating group
action or bringing any group concern to management. When
coworkers participated in these Facebook “conversations,” they
did so only to express amusement or sympathy but not because
they shared a common concern about the effects of the
supervisor’s conduct upon their terms and conditions of
employment.118
L. Calling a Fellow Bartender a Cheater
In late 2010, Janelle Morehart began posting her concerns on
Facebook about a new fellow bartender, a friend of the new general
manager of Rock Wood Fired Pizza & Spirits, claiming he was a “cheater”
and “screwing” customers because he was using mixes instead of premium
liquors, and stating: “Dishonest employees along with management that
turns their head, will be the death of any business.”119 However, other

113. See Sagepoint Fin. Adv. Mem., supra note 12, at *1.
114. See Sagepoint Fin. Adv. Mem., supra note 12, at *1–2.
115. See Sagepoint Fin. Adv. Mem., supra note 12, at *1 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
116. See Sagepoint Fin. Adv. Mem., supra note 12, at *2 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
117. See Sagepoint Fin. Adv. Mem., supra note 12, at *2.
118. See Sagepoint Fin. Adv. Mem., supra note 12, at *3.
119. Rock Wood Adv. Mem., supra note 16, at *1–2 (internal quotation marks omitted);
see also N.L.R.B. Charge Against Employer, No. 19-CA-32981 (Feb. 28, 2011) (copy on
file with author).
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employees were concerned that customers would see the posts.120 Morehart
was subsequently fired for “[u]se of unprofessional communication on her
[F]acebook to fellow employees viewed by employees.”121
The NLRB’s Office of the General Counsel concluded Morehart’s
activity was not protected under the NRLA.122 However, the General
Counsel’s office did agree that the employer’s “Team Member Conduct &
Work Rules” were unlawfully broad because the prohibitions on
“disrespectful conduct” and “inappropriate conversations” would
reasonably be construed by employees to preclude section 7 activity.123
However, discipline imposed under an unlawfully overly broad rule
violates the NLRA only when the affected employee has been engaging in
protected concerted activity.124 As noted by the Office of the General
Counsel:
Here, the Charging Party’s Facebook posts regarding her fellow
bartender’s job performance had only a very attenuated
connection with terms and conditions of employment. She made
the posts because she was upset that he was passing off lowgrade drinks as premium liquor and management was condoning
the action . . . . Although she later stated that she was concerned
that the bartender’s conduct would cause customers to stop
buying drinks or lower their tips if they found out, she did not
state this concern in her posts. And this assertion is belied by the
fact that she was communicating with customers about the
bartenders’ [sic] conduct, which if anything would cause the
impact on business she now asserts she was trying to prevent.125
M. Posting That You Are a Hair Away from Setting It Off
In January 2011, a Frito-Lay employee was upset that his supervisor
would subtract “attendance points” if the employee left early because he
was not feeling well, posting his frustration on Facebook: “I think they
trying to give me a reason to be fired because I’m about a hair away from
setting it off in that BITCH.hahahaha.”126 The HR Manager considered the
120. A coworker responded to the post indicating Morehart should be careful about
posting on Facebook. Rock Wood Adv. Mem., supra note 16, at *2 (citing a coworker who
posted: “[I] agree . . . careful what u post, feel me?”).
121. Rock Wood Adv. Mem., supra note 16, at *2 (internal quotation marks omitted).
122. Rock Wood Adv. Mem., supra note 16, at *2.
123. Rock Wood Adv. Mem., supra note 16, at *2 (internal quotation marks omitted).
124. Rock Wood Adv. Mem., supra note 16, at *2.
125. Rock Wood Adv. Mem., supra note 16, at *3.
126. Advice Memorandum from the NLRB Office of the Gen. Counsel to Richard L.
Ahearn, Regional Director of Region 19, Frito-Lay, Inc., No. 36-CA-10882, 2011 WL
4526828, at *1 (Sept. 19, 2011) [hereinafter Frito-Lay Adv. Mem.], available at
http://mynlrb.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/09031d4580681026.
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employee’s post a threat and suspended the employee pending an
investigation, and subsequently fired the employee because his “Facebook
comments were inappropriate, threatening and violent.”127
The NLRB’s Office of the General Counsel concluded there was no
evidence of concerted activity.128 “Although the [employee’s] postings
addressed his terms and conditions of employment, he did not seek to
initiate or induce coworkers to engage in group action, and none of his
coworkers responded to the postings with similar concerns.”129
N. Using an Obscenity as Your Job Title on LinkedIn
In early 2010, an employee of Schulte, Roth & Zabel was invited by a
fellow employee to join the LinkedIn online networking site.130 The invited
employee accepted the invitation, which, because LinkedIn is a
professional- and business-related website, included the entry of job-related
information, such as the name of employer and job title. As a joke,
thinking only his supervisor would see it, the invited employee entered his
job title as “fucktard.”131 A few months later, as the employer began
investigating setting up its own LinkedIn site, it began viewing its own
employees’ profiles on LinkedIn and discovered the employee’s joke job
title; thereafter discharging him for violating the employer’s Electronic
Communication Policy by disparaging the company.132 The NLRB’s
Office of the General Counsel fundamentally concluded that the
employee’s LinkedIn “joke” was clearly not protected concerted activity.133
The employee had claimed the LinkedIn job description was merely a
pretext for dismissing him due to his conversations with other employees
about the employer’s overtime compensation, noting the LinkedIn “joke”
was online for over a year before he was fired, though he had begun the
overtime conversations only two months earlier.134 The NLRB’s Office of
the General Counsel noted that “timing alone does not establish a prima
facie case.”135 In particular, there was no evidence the employer was even
aware of the employee’s overtime discussions.136
127. Frito-Lay Adv. Mem., supra note 126 at *2.
128. Frito-Lay Adv. Mem., supra note 126 at *2.
129. Frito-Lay Adv. Mem., supra note 126 at *2.
130. Advice Memorandum from the NLRB Office of the Gen. Counsel to Elbert F.
Tellem, Acting Regional Director for Region 2, Schulte, Roth & Zabel, No. 02-CA-60476,
2011 WL 5122642, at *1 (Oct. 13, 2011) [hereinafter Schulte, Roth & Zabel Adv. Mem.],
available at http://mynlrb.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/09031d45806bab9f.
131. Schulte, Roth & Zabel Adv. Mem., supra note 130, at *1.
132. Schulte, Roth & Zabel Adv. Mem., supra note 130, at *1.
133. Schulte, Roth & Zabel Adv. Mem., supra note 130, at *1.
134. Schulte, Roth & Zabel Adv. Mem., supra note 130, at *1.
135. Schulte, Roth & Zabel Adv. Mem., supra note 130, at *1 (citing Wright Line, 251
N.L.R.B. 1083, 1089 (1980) (requiring that the General Counsel make a prima facie
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O. Complaining About a Customer on Facebook
During a lunch break in April 2011, a service representative of a credit
union posted a comment on his Facebook page describing an interaction
with a customer that resulted in the customer lodging a complaint against
the representative (based on the interaction, not the Facebook posting).137
The employee’s initial posting was followed by an online “conversation”
with two friends generally denigrating the customer and the employee’s
supervisor.138 A few days later, the employee again vented about work via
Facebook, with a customer “friend” joining the “conversation.”139 The
employee was subsequently fired for making derogatory statements about a
customer.140 In concluding the employee was not engaged in protected
concerted activity,141 the NLRB’s Office of the General Counsel stated:
Here, the Charging Party’s . . . Facebook post, for which he was
discharged, was merely an expression of an individual gripe
about a customer. The Charging Party admitted that he posted
this comment because he was frustrated and that he was not
trying to get other employees to take any action. Indeed, the post
contains no language suggesting that he sought to initiate or
induce coworkers to engage in group action, and the post did not
grow out of a prior discussion about terms and conditions of
employment with his coworkers or even reference terms and
conditions of employment. As he put it, he was merely
“venting.”142
P. Posting on Facebook That a Coworker’s “Sucking His Teeth” is
Driving You Nuts
In January 2011, a respiratory therapist was traveling in an ambulance
with coworkers to pick up a patient. One of the coworkers kept sucking his
showing sufficient to support the inference that protected conduct was a motivating factor in
the employer’s decision; and once this is established, the burden will shift to the employer to
demonstrate that the same action would have taken place even in the absence of the
protected conduct)).
136. Schulte, Roth & Zabel Adv. Mem., supra note 130, at *1. See infra notes 352-54
and accompanying text for a discussion of the lawfulness of the employer’s Electronic
Communication Policy.
137. Advice Memorandum from the NLRB Office of the Gen. Counsel to Wanda Pate
Jones, Regional Director of Region 27, Public Service Credit Union, No. 27-CA-21923,
2011 WL 5822506, at *1 (Nov. 1, 2011) [hereinafter Public Service Credit Union Adv.
Mem.], available at http://mynlrb.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/09031d45806fc018.
138. Public Service Credit Union Adv. Mem., supra note 137, at *2.
139. Public Service Credit Union Adv. Mem., supra note 137, at *2.
140. Public Service Credit Union Adv. Mem., supra note 137, at *2.
141. Public Service Credit Union Adv. Mem., supra note 137, at *3.
142. Public Service Credit Union Adv. Mem., supra note 137, at *3.
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teeth during the ride to pick up the patient, irritating the therapist to the
point she used her iPhone to post on her Facebook page, “REALLY!!!!
Must you suck your teeth every 30 seconds. It is driving me nuts.”143 Two
of her Facebook nonemployee friends responded with supporting
comments and, in reply, the employee wrote: “Actually they are about to
get, beat senseless with a ventilator. [sic] It’s in the back of an ambulance
and I can’t get away from them. UGH!!!”144 A coworker saw the
Facebook post and reported it to the employer, considering it a threat.145
The therapist was suspended for two days “because of her negative and
threatening Facebook comments” about her coworker.146
In concluding the employee was not engaged in protected concerted
activity and therefore the employer did not violate the Act by disciplining
her,147 the NLRB’s Office of the General Counsel stated:
The Charging Party’s . . . post was not protected because it did
not concern terms and conditions of employment. She was
merely complaining about the irritating sounds her coworker was
making during the transport that evening, and was not even
suggesting that the Employer should do anything about it.
Therefore, her complaint about the co-worker’s noises, and her
alleged threat to hit him with a ventilator to stop them, is not
Section 7 protected.148
Q. Accusing Your Employer of Fraud
During the early part of 2011, an accountant-employee of TAW, Inc.,
was working with an outside auditor to complete the employer’s annual
audit.149 During the audit, the employee’s supervisor informed her that the
supervisor had made a serious accounting error that resulted in a large
overstatement of revenue and rather than correct the error, the employer’s
Chief Operating Officer had decided to allocate it over the rest of the
year.150 The employee was concerned this tactic contravened generally
143. Advice Memorandum for the NLRB Office of the Gen. Counsel to Wayne Gold,
Regional Director of Region 5, Children’s National Medical Center, No. 05-CA-36658,
2011 WL 6009620, at *1 (Nov. 14, 2011) [hereinafter Children’s Nat’l Med. Ctr. Adv.
Mem.], available at http://mynlrb.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/09031d45806fc01d.
144. Children’s Nat’l Med. Ctr. Adv. Mem., supra note 143, at *1.
145. Children’s Nat’l Med. Ctr. Adv. Mem., supra note 143, at *1.
146. Children’s Nat’l Med. Ctr. Adv. Mem., supra note 143, at *1.
147. Children’s Nat’l Med. Ctr. Adv. Mem., supra note 143, at *2.
148. Children’s Nat’l Med. Ctr. Adv. Mem., supra note 143, at *2.
149. Advice Memorandum from the NLRB Office of the Gen. Counsel to Ronald K.
Hooks, Regional Director of Region 26, TAW, Inc., No. 26-CA-63082, 2011 WL 6543304,
at *1 (Nov. 22, 2011) [hereinafter TAW Adv. Mem.], available at
http://mynlrb.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/09031d4580755f55.
150. TAW Adv. Mem., supra note 149, at *1.
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accepted accounting principles (“GAAP”), particularly because the
employee was going to be asked to sign a letter of representation at the
conclusion of the audit stating that, to the best of her knowledge, the
information was true, accurate, and correct, and that she was not aware of
any fraud.151 The employee ultimately discussed the situation with the
employer’s general counsel, who promised to look into the matter.152 On
April 15, when the audit was complete, the employee confirmed the error
had not been corrected and refused to sign the letter of representation.153
A meeting was scheduled for April 18 with the employee, her
supervisor, the general counsel, and the outside auditor. Prior to the April
18 meeting, the employee posted on her Facebook page, “I wonder if
accounting degrees used to be given out based on different criteria since I
am fairly certain GAAP standards have always deemed certain things
fraud.”154 Although the employer was aware of the employee’s Facebook
post prior to the April 18 meeting, it was not discussed at the meeting.155
However, at the meeting, the auditor assured the employee that the
employer was not engaged in fraud and that the audit conformed to
generally accepted accounting principles, and the employee signed the
letter of representation at the end of the meeting.156
A few days later, the employer’s general counsel informed the
employee that the employer was aware of the employee’s Facebook post
suggesting the employer was engaged in fraud, and asked the employee to
remove the post.157 The employee did not believe she should be required to
remove the post and did not do so.158 A few days later the employee was
fired for refusing to remove the post.159
The NLRB’s Office of the General Counsel concluded the employee
was not engaged in conduct protected by section 7.160 In particular, the
General Counsel’s office determined that the employee was informed at the
April 18 meeting that the employer was not engaged in fraud; therefore, she
was aware her Facebook post was false and her subsequent insistence on
retaining the post was not protected activity.161
151. TAW Adv. Mem., supra note 149, at *1.
152. TAW Adv. Mem., supra note 149, at *1.
153. TAW Adv. Mem., supra note 149, at *1.
154. TAW Adv. Mem., supra note 149, at *1.
155. TAW Adv. Mem., supra note 149, at *2.
156. TAW Adv. Mem., supra note 149, at *2.
157. TAW Adv. Mem., supra note 149, at *2.
158. TAW Adv. Mem., supra note 149, at *2.
159. TAW Adv. Mem., supra note 149, at *2.
160. TAW Adv. Mem., supra note 149, at *2.
161. TAW Adv. Mem., supra note 149, at *2. (citing Valley Hosp. Med. Ctr., 351
N.L.R.B. 1250, 1252 (2007) (“Statements are unprotected if they are maliciously untrue,
i.e., if they are made with knowledge of their falsity or with reckless disregard for their truth
or falsity.”)).
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R. Complaining that Coworkers Are “Narcs”
At the end of their shifts, bank tellers at Copiah Bank are required to
report a list of transactions to the bank’s main branch so that it can balance
the transactions on an ongoing basis throughout the day.162 On one
particular day, one of the bank tellers was blamed for a delay in balancing
the transactions because she could not send her transactions at the usual
time because a customer was still in the bank.163 Later that evening, the
teller posted on her Facebook page, “[h]ates it when idiot people narc and
they have no clue what they are talking about!!”164 In response to the post,
there was a short online “conversation” between the teller and a
nonemployee relative.165 In addition, a coworker from the main branch
asked, via Facebook, whether the teller was talking about the coworker, to
which the teller replied, “[n]ot just you but everybody else down there.”166
The following day, the teller was instructed to remove the Facebook
post, which she did.167 In addition, the teller apologized, via Facebook, to
the coworker in the main branch.168 The next day, the teller was informed
that the CEO of the bank had ordered the teller’s termination because he
“didn’t like to be called an idiot.”169 However, a few days later, the CEO
reconsidered and told the teller she could return to her job if she would
issue an apology to all bank employees, which she refused to do.170
The NLRB’s Office of the General Counsel concluded that the teller
did not post her comment on her Facebook page in furtherance of concerted
activity for mutual aid or protection—the teller admitted that she was not
speaking on behalf of any other employees, nor was there evidence that she
was looking to engage in group action when she posted her comments on

162. Advice Memorandum from the NLRB Office of the Gen. Counsel to Kathleen
McKinney, Regional Director of Region 15, Copiah Bank, No. 15-CA-61204, 2011 WL
6543300, at *1 (Dec. 1, 2011) [hereinafter Copiah Bank Adv. Mem.], available at
http://mynlrb.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/09031d4580755f54.
163. Copiah Bank Adv. Mem., supra note 162, at *1.
164. Copiah Bank Adv. Mem., supra note 162, at *2. The NLRB recognized the bank
teller “was not referring literally to narcotics or a narcotics agent, but was using ‘narc’ in the
colloquial sense of ‘tattling’ on someone else.” Copiah Bank Adv. Mem., supra note 162, at
*n1.
165. Copiah Bank Adv. Mem., supra note 162, at *1.
166. Copiah Bank Adv. Mem., supra note 162, at *1. (implying “down there” meant the
bank’s main branch).
167. Copiah Bank Adv. Mem., supra note 162, at *1.
168. Copiah Bank Adv. Mem., supra note 162, at *1.
169. Copiah Bank Adv. Mem., supra note 162, at *2 (internal quotation marks omitted).
170. Copiah Bank Adv. Mem., supra note 162, at *2.
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Facebook.171 As such, the bank did not violate the NLRA by discharging
her.172
S. Poor Performance Coupled with Facebook Postings
A director at Intermountain Specialized Abuse Treatment Center, a
provider of therapy services to individuals and families who are affected by
domestic violence or sexual abuse (as well as offenders), was monitoring
one of the therapists for poor performance, particularly conduct during
therapy sessions.173 At one point during this period, the director announced
at a staff meeting that the therapist was to be replaced for certain group
therapy sessions. That night, the therapist posted a complaint about work
on her Facebook page, to which friends and relatives responded.174 The
following day, however, in response to the Facebook post, a coworker
inquired, “[i]s this where we can complain about work?”175 The therapist
and the coworker then exchanged a few messages discussing how to cope
with their boss.176 Another therapist reported the Facebook postings to the
director.177 Due to further complaints about the therapist’s performance,
the director brought the therapist into his office to discharge her. The
conversation began with a discussion of the therapist’s Facebook posts;
however, the therapist left the meeting before the director could address her
performance issues.178
The NLRB’s Office of the General Counsel concluded that the
therapist was not engaged in protected concerted activity; here, the
therapist’s Facebook posting was merely an expression of an individual
gripe about an action by the director that affected only the therapist.179 The
Office of the General Counsel stated:
The posting contained no language suggesting that she sought to
initiate or induce coworkers to engage in group action. And the
only co-worker who commented in response to the posting stated
that he did not think that the Charging Party’s post was an
171. Copiah Bank Adv. Mem., supra note 162, at *2.
172. Copiah Bank Adv. Mem., supra note 162, at *2.
173. See Advice Memorandum from the NLRB Office of the Gen. Counsel to Wanda
Pate Jones, Regional Director of Region 27, Intermountain Specialized Abuse Treatment
Center, No. 27-CA-065577, 2011 WL 6543306, at *1 (Dec. 6, 2011) [hereinafter
Intermountain Adv. Mem.], available at http://mynlrb.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/
09031d458077b79d.
174. Intermountain Adv. Mem., supra note 173, at *2.
175. Intermountain Adv. Mem., supra note 173, at *3. (internal quotation marks
omitted).
176. Intermountain Adv. Mem., supra note 173, at *3.
177. Intermountain Adv. Mem., supra note 173, at *3.
178. Intermountain Adv. Mem., supra note 173, at *3.
179. Intermountain Adv. Mem., supra note 173, at *3.

FINAL DRAFT

982

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 14:4

attempt to change anything at work. The only other therapist in
the office not only did not join in the “discussion” but viewed the
posting as inappropriate and reported it to the Director.180
Further, the Office of the General Counsel concluded there was ample
evidence to support the employer’s assertion that it would have discharged
the therapist for ongoing performance issues regardless of her Facebook
posting.181 The Office of the General Counsel also rejected the therapist’s
claim that the employer had engaged in unlawful surveillance of her
Facebook activities, noting there was no evidence that the employer
solicited the information; instead, the employer learned about the
therapist’s Facebook posting from her coworker.182
T. Commenting to Former Coworkers
A hospital nurse who had been transferred from the intensive care unit
(ICU) initiated an email exchange through Facebook with a former
coworker—who still worked at the hospital in the ICU—in which the nurse
made derogatory comments about the ICU supervisor.183 The coworker
took exception to the nurse’s comments and informed the nurse’s
supervisor about the comments, at which point the nurse was suspended
pending an investigation.184 One week later, the nurse was fired based on
allegations of sexual harassment that arose during the investigation.185
At issue was the fact that the discharge occurred close in time to the
email exchange with the coworker.186 However, the NLRB’s Office of the
General Counsel concluded the suspension and discharge did not violate
section 8(a)(1) because the nurse was not engaged in protected section 7
conduct.187 In particular:
The Charging Party’s communication with Former Co-worker
was not concerted activity for mutual aid and protection, but
merely a personal gripe about Charging Party’s former
supervisors. The communication was not an attempt to initiate
group action, and it did not involve a discussion among
employees regarding their shared concerns about working

180. Intermountain Adv. Mem., supra note 173, at *3.
181. Intermountain Adv. Mem., supra note 173, at *3.
182. Intermountain Adv. Mem., supra note 173, at *3.
183. See Advice Memorandum from the NLRB Office of the Gen. Counsel to Rochelle
Kentov, Regional Director of Region 12, Miami Jewish Health Systems, No. 12-CA-65993,
2011 WL 6960023, *1 (Dec. 14, 2011) [hereinafter Miami Jewish Health Adv. Mem.],
available at http://mynlrb.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/09031d458079355d.
184. Miami Jewish Health Adv. Mem., supra note 183, at *2.
185. Miami Jewish Health Adv. Mem., supra note 183, at *2.
186. Miami Jewish Health Adv. Mem., supra note 183, at *2.
187. Miami Jewish Health Adv. Mem., supra note 183, at *2.
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conditions; indeed, the only recipient of the emails was Former
Co-worker, and she not only did not share Charging Party’s
concerns but found the emails inappropriate and reported them to
her manager. There is no evidence that the Charging Party’s
statements were a continuation of earlier concerted discussions or
other activities.188
As such, even if the nurse was discharged as a result of the email
messages as opposed to the alleged harassment—which appears to have
been the motive for the employer’s action—the nurse was not engaged in
protected concerted activity.189
U. Miscellaneous Social Media Incidents
On January 24, 2012, the NLRB’s Acting General Counsel released a
memorandum summarizing fourteen charges “concerning the protected
and/or concerted nature of employees’ social media postings and the
lawfulness of employers’ social media policies and rules,” which have been
presented to the Regional Offices and are then submitted to the NLRB’s
Division of Advice for consideration by the Office of the General
Counsel.190 Based on the facts presented in the memorandum, four of the
incidents have been the focus of formal Advice Memoranda and have
already been discussed.191 Of the remaining ten incidents: one involves
protected concerted activity subject to an overly-broad social media
policy;192 two involve unprotected activity, but still overly-broad social
media policies;193 four involve protected concerted activity with no
discussion of the employer’s social media policy;194 and three solely
involve discussions of the employer’s social media policy.195 The seven
incidents involving online postings summarized in this latest memorandum
are discussed below.

188. Miami Jewish Health Adv. Mem., supra note 183, at *3.
189. Miami Jewish Health Adv. Mem., supra note 183, at *2.
190. Memorandum from Lafe Solomon, Acting Gen. Counsel, NLRB to All Regional
Directors, Officers-in-Charge, and Resident Officers, Report of the Acting Gen. Counsel
Concerning Social Media Cases, at 2 (Jan. 24, 2012) [hereinafter Acting General Counsel’s
Memo], available at http://mynlrb.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/09031d45807d6567.
191. See supra Parts II.J., L., M., and P. It can only be presumed that the remaining ten
incidents have not been the subject of formal Advice Memoranda, as the employers and
Charging Parties are not identified in the Acting General Counsel’s Memo.
192. See infra Part II.U.1.
193. See infra Parts II.U.2. and 3.
194. See infra Parts II.U.4., 5., 6., and 7.
195. See Acting General Counsel’s Memo, supra note 190, at 13–18; infra Part III.B.
(discussing social media policies).
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1. Posting that Your Employer Had “Messed Up”
After a collections agency employee was transferred to a position she
believed would lead to lower compensation, she posted on her Facebook
wall, using expletives, that her employer had “messed up” and “she was
done with being a good employee.”196 Approximately ten coworkers and
the employee’s immediate supervisor were among her Facebook friends,
and at least two coworkers posted supportive comments, along with a
number of former coworkers.197 The next day, the employee was fired due
to her Facebook comments.198 The NRLB’s Office of the General Counsel
concluded the employer’s rule prohibiting “[m]aking disparaging
comments about the company through any media, including online blogs,
other electronic media or through the media” was unlawful because it
would reasonably be construed to restrict section 7 activity—for example,
prohibiting statements that the employer was not treating employees fairly
or paying them sufficiently.199
The General Counsel’s office also concluded that the employee was
engaged in protected concerted activity: she initiated her Facebook
discussion after being transferred to a less-lucrative position; coworkers
responded, echoing their frustrations with the employer’s treatment of
employees; as such, the initial posting and follow-up discussion “clearly
involved complaints about working conditions . . . .”200 The General
Counsel’s office concluded that the employee was fired in violation of
section 8(a)(1) because it was done pursuant to an overly broad nondisparagement rule.201
2. Complaining About a Reprimand
After being reprimanded by a supervisor in front of a Regional
Manager for not performing a task she had never been told to perform, an
employee of a home-improvement store used her phone during her lunch
break to update her Facebook status with a comment that included an
expletive with the store’s name.202 Four individuals, including one
coworker, indicated they “Liked” the employee’s status comment.203 The
employee posted another Facebook comment, and had some face-to-face
conversations with coworkers about the incident, but the general responses
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.

See Acting General Counsel’s Memo, supra note 190, at 3.
See Acting General Counsel’s Memo, supra note 190, at 4.
See Acting General Counsel’s Memo, supra note 190, at 4.
See Acting General Counsel’s Memo, supra note 190, at 4.
See Acting General Counsel’s Memo, supra note 190, at 5.
See Acting General Counsel’s Memo, supra note 190, at 5.
See Acting General Counsel’s Memo, supra note 190, at 6.
See Acting General Counsel’s Memo, supra note 190, at 6.
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of coworkers were limited to sympathy for the employee’s plight.204 Six
weeks after the original incident, the employee was fired due to her
Facebook postings.205 Subsequent to the employee’s dismissal, the
employer issued a new social media policy, providing that, “in external
social networking situations, employees should generally avoid identifying
themselves as the Employer’s employees, unless there was a legitimate
business need to do so or when discussing terms and conditions of
employment in an appropriate manner.”206
The NLRB’s Office of the General Counsel concluded the employee’s
Facebook posts were not protected because they “were merely an
expression of an individual gripe[,]” and because there were no other
efforts to induce or prepare for group action.207 However, the General
Counsel’s office took issue with the employer’s social media policy—in
particular, its restriction to only “appropriate” employment-related
discussions.208 The policy provided no definition or examples of what
would be appropriate or inappropriate discussions; “employees would
therefore reasonably interpret the rule to prohibit protected activity,
including criticism of the Employer’s labor policies, treatment of
employees, and terms and conditions of employment.”209
3. Ranting Against Coworkers
An employee who had become the target of coworkers’ insults and
threats posted a rant on Facebook against those coworkers and her
employer, stating that she hated people at work and wanted to be left
alone.210 The employee was fired due, in part, to her Facebook posting.211
The NLRB’s Office of the General Counsel concluded the employee was
not engaged in concerted activity because she was expressing personal
anger with coworkers and the employer that were made solely on her
own.212 However, the General Counsel’s office concluded that the
employer’s social media policy, which prohibited employees “from using
social media to engage in unprofessional communication that could

204. See Acting General Counsel’s Memo, supra note 190, at 6.
205. See Acting General Counsel’s Memo, supra note 190, at 7.
206. See Acting General Counsel’s Memo, supra note 190, at 7.
207. See Acting General Counsel’s Memo, supra note 190, at 7.
208. See Acting General Counsel’s Memo, supra note 190, at 7.
209. See Acting General Counsel’s Memo, supra note 190, at 8. The General Counsel’s
Office concluded also that the social media policy’s “savings clause” was insufficient to
cure the ambiguities within the policy. See Acting General Counsel’s Memo, supra note
190, at 8.
210. Acting General Counsel’s Memo, supra note 190, at 11.
211. Acting General Counsel’s Memo, supra note 190, at 12.
212. Acting General Counsel’s Memo, supra note 190, at 12.
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negatively impact the Employer’s reputation or interfere with the
Employer’s mission or unprofessional/inappropriate communication
regarding members of the Employer’s community,” was unlawfully broad
in violation of section 8(a)(1) because it would reasonably be construed to
chill employees in the exercise of their section 7 rights.213
4. Complaining About Sexist Remarks
After a male manager remarked to the Charging Party, a female, that
he was not surprised she and a fellow female coworker had not been at
work the previous day because of a severe snowstorm, and after the
Charging Party had not received a response from her supervisor or the HR
Assistant to her complaint about what she perceived to be this sexist
remark by the manager, she used her cell phone to post a comment on her
Facebook page, indicating, with some profanity, that “she did not want to
be told that she was less of a person because she was a female.”214 This led
to a Facebook “conversation” over the next few hours with various friends,
only one of whom was a coworker, in which the Charging Party made a
number of derogatory remarks about the manager, though without
expressly naming him.215 A week later, after a coworker was fired (for
unrelated activities), the Charging Party posted additional Facebook
comments about her work situation.216
The Charging Party was an administrative assistant to whom many
coworkers would turn to for advice about work problems.217 In a meeting
with the employer’s President following the Facebook postings, the
President stated that the Charging Party had previously been warned not to
get involved with other employees’ problems. The Charging Party was
then fired because she “had continued to voice her opinions on Facebook
on company time . . . .”218 Here, the NLRB’s Office of the General
Counsel concluded that the Charging Party had been engaged in protected
concerted activity because she often had discussions with fellow employees
about terms and conditions of employment, and her Facebook postings
“precipitated her discharge because the Employer perceived that she would
not comply with his oral warning not to engage in protected conversations

213. Acting General Counsel’s Memo, supra note 190, at 12. Although the employee
was fired for violating the employer’s overly broad social media policy, her discharge did
not violate section 8(a)(1) because she was not fired for engaging in concerted activity.
Acting General Counsel’s Memo, supra note 190, at 12.
214. Acting General Counsel’s Memo, supra note 190, at 18.
215. Acting General Counsel’s Memo, supra note 190, at 18–19.
216. Acting General Counsel’s Memo, supra note 190, at 19.
217. Acting General Counsel’s Memo, supra note 190, at 18.
218. Acting General Counsel’s Memo, supra note 190, at 19.
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with her fellow employees about their working conditions.”219 The General
Counsel’s office concluded that the Charging Party’s discharge was, in
essence, a “pre-emptive” strike by the President because of his fear of what
the Charging Party’s discussions might lead to.220
5. Complaining About a Coworker’s Promotion
After the employer promoted an employee to the position of comanager, the Charging Party posted a message on Facebook reflecting her
frustration.221 This led to a Facebook “conversation” among the Charging
Party and three Facebook coworker friends, which included complaints
about the promoted employee and mismanagement.222 One of the
coworkers commented that, “it would be pretty funny if all of the good
employees actually quit.”223 The Charging Party commented that she had
not received a raise or a review in three years.224 Of the four workers who
participated in the Facebook conversation, two, including the Charging
Party, were fired; the other two were disciplined—all due to the Facebook
posts.225
The NLRB’s Office of the General Counsel concluded the four
employees were engaged in protected concerted activity; they had
discussed their shared concerns about terms and conditions of
employment.226 While the concerted aspect of their discussions may have
been preliminary in nature, the General Counsel’s office concluded they
had been halted by the employer’s pre-emptive discharge and discipline of
the four employees.227
6. Stating That You Hate Where You Work
In February 2011, several employees engaged in a Facebook
“conversation” discussing issues at work including postings by the
Charging Party which included comments that she hated “that place” and
that the Operations Manager was the one “who made it so bad.”228 A few

219. Acting General Counsel’s Memo, supra note 190, at 20.
220. Acting General Counsel’s Memo, supra note 190, at 20.
221. Acting General Counsel’s Memo, supra note 190, at 20.
222. Acting General Counsel’s Memo, supra note 190, at 21.
223. Acting General Counsel’s Memo, supra note 190, at 21.
224. Acting General Counsel’s Memo, supra note 190, at 21.
225. Acting General Counsel’s Memo, supra note 190, at 21.
226. Acting General Counsel’s Memo, supra note 190, at 21 (noting also that prior to
the Facebook postings, the Charging Party had spoken to two coworkers on separate
occasions over how the employer had selected the employee for promotion).
227. Acting General Counsel’s Memo, supra note 190, at 22.
228. Acting General Counsel’s Memo, supra note 190, at 23.
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days later the Charging Party was fired due to her Facebook posts.229 The
NLRB’s Office of the General Counsel concluded the Charging Party’s
Facebook posts constituted protected concerted activity because (1)
“employee complaints and criticism about a supervisor’s attitude and
performance may be protected by the Act,” and (2) the Facebook
“conversation” was a continuation of earlier group action that included
employee complaints to management about the Operations Manager.230 In
this incident, the General Counsel’s office considered whether the
Charging Party lost protection because the Facebook “conversation” could
be viewed by nonemployee members of the public, possibly harming the
employer’s reputation and business.231 It concluded, however, that the
Charging Party did not lose protection of the Act because, while her
comments were critical of the Operations Manager, they were not
defamatory and were “not in any way critical of the Employer’s product or
business policies.”232
7. Making Multiple Accusations Against Your Employer
A hospital disciplined and ultimately terminated a nurse due to his
numerous online postings and public statements, including: repeatedly
asserting the hospital’s conduct had contributed to a fired employee
shooting two supervisors, killing one and critically wounding the other;
accusing the hospital of abusing its employees in a letter to the local
newspaper; posting online that the hospital had been named in an unfair
labor charge; and sending a local newspaper an online letter to the editor
critical of the hospital.233 The nurse was reprimanded for the last two
comments.234 The nurse was suspended after another of his letters to the
editor was posted on the newspaper’s website and he posted a follow-up
comment on the newspaper’s online forum, claiming that four employees
who had “stood up to management . . . were subjected to abuse and
manipulation.”235 Three months later, the nurse made a presentation to the
borough assembly, the text of which was posted on the nurse’s Facebook
page and in the newspaper, charging that “under the leadership of the
Employer’s CEO, there had been multiple unfair labor practices filed,
forced policy changes, a murder/suicide, unfair firings, harassment, and

229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.

Acting General Counsel’s Memo, supra note 190, at 23.
Acting General Counsel’s Memo, supra note 190, at 23.
Acting General Counsel’s Memo, supra note 190, at 25.
Acting General Counsel’s Memo, supra note 190, at 25.
Acting General Counsel’s Memo, supra note 190, at 26.
Acting General Counsel’s Memo, supra note 190, at 26–27.
Acting General Counsel’s Memo, supra note 190, at 27.
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workplace bullying.”236 The nurse was then fired for posting the
presentation.237
The NLRB’s Office of the General Counsel concluded the comments
and communications relied upon by the hospital in disciplining and firing
the nurse “were related to and in the context of an on-going labor dispute
between the employees and their employer.”238 It noted in particular that
the nurse’s statements were widely followed by fellow employees.239 The
General Counsel’s office concluded also that the nurse’s comments did not
lose protection of the Act for being disparaging: they “were general
criticisms of the Employer’s treatment of its employees and their working
conditions and were related to and in the context of ongoing labor disputes.
Moreover, the criticisms did not disparage the Employer’s product: its
provision of healthcare.”240
V. Facebook Posts Containing Racial Stereotypes and Slurs
After the Charging Party, an employee at the Detroit Medical Center,
received a promotion and raise, other employees complained that his
promotion and raise violated their collective bargaining agreement, and the
Charging Party ultimately lost his promotion and raise for that reason.241 In
response, the Charging Party posted derogatory comments about his
coworkers on his Facebook page that contained racial stereotypes and
slurs.242 In response to the Facebook comments, the Charging Party’s
workplace locker was vandalized and he was told to stay at home a few
days until the workplace atmosphere cooled.243 The Charging Party was
disciplined and placed on probation for violating the employer’s social
media policy.244
The NLRB’s Office of the General Counsel conceded the Charging
Party’s Facebook posts could have constituted protected concerted activity
since they arguably contained “complaints about his union’s performance
of its representational duties . . . .”245 The General Counsel’s office
concluded, however, that the posts lost their section 7 protection because
236. Acting General Counsel’s Memo, supra note 190, at 27.
237. Acting General Counsel’s Memo, supra note 190, at 27.
238. Acting General Counsel’s Memo, supra note 190, at 27.
239. Acting General Counsel’s Memo, supra note 190, at 28–29.
240. Acting General Counsel’s Memo, supra note 190, at 29.
241. Advice Memorandum from the NLRB Office of the Gen. Counsel to Ray Kassab,
Acting Regional Director of Region 7, Detroit Medical Center, No. 07-CA-06682, 2012 WL
1795803, at *1 (Jan. 10, 2012) [hereinafter Detroit Med. Ctr. Adv. Mem.] available at
http://mynlrb.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/09031d458084ffc5.
242. Detroit Med. Ctr. Adv. Mem., supra note 241, at *1-2.
243. Detroit Med. Ctr. Adv. Mem., supra note 241, at *2.
244. Detroit Med. Ctr. Adv. Mem., supra note 241, at *2.
245. Detroit Med. Ctr. Adv. Mem., supra note 241, at *3.
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the Charging Party’s use of offensive racial stereotypes was opprobrious
and caused a serious disruption in the workplace.
W. Criticizing Coworkers
Five employees of Hispanics United of Buffalo, Inc. (“HUB”), a nonprofit corporation which renders social services to its economically
disadvantaged clients in Buffalo, New York, engaged in a Facebook
“conversation” in which they expressed their concern over being criticized
by a particular coworker who was also threatening to complain about their
job performances to supervisors.246 The target of the criticisms complained
to HUB’s Executive Director about the Facebook posts and the five
employees were subsequently fired.247
In determining the firings were an unlawful violation of the NLRA,248
the ALJ stated:
The [five fired employees] were taking a first step towards taking
group action to defend themselves against the accusations they
could reasonably believe [their coworker] was going to make to
management.
By discharging the . . . [employees, HUB]
prevented them by [sic] taking any further group action vis-à-vis
[the coworker’s] criticisms. Moreover, the fact that [HUB]
lumped the [employees] together in terminating them, establishes
that [HUB] viewed the five as a group and that their activity was
concerted.249
The ALJ continued:
Just as the protection of Sections 7 and 8 of the Act does not
depend on whether organizing activity was ongoing, it does not
depend on whether the employees herein had brought their
concerns to management before they were fired, or that there is
no express evidence that they intended to take further action, or
that they were not attempting to change any of their working
conditions.250
In conclusion, “[e]xplicit or implicit criticism by a co-worker of the
manner in which they are performing their jobs is a subject about which
employee discussion is protected by Section 7.”251
246. Hispanics United of Buffalo, Inc., Docket No. 3-CA-27872, 2011 WL 3894520, at
4-6
(N.L.R.B.
Div.
of
Judges
Sept.
2,
2011),
available
at
http://mynlrb.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/ 09031d4580622877 (pagination based on
NLRB-source document).
247. Id. at 6.
248. Id. at 7.
249. Id. at 8–9.
250. Id. at 9.
251. Id. at 9.

FINAL DRAFT

2012]

FACEBOOK MEETS THE NLRB

991

X. Embarrassing Your Employer
Robert Becker, a salesman with Knauz BMW, was concerned that the
dealership was going to serve hot dogs from a hot dog cart and bagged
chips at a promotional event celebrating a redesigned BMW model, and
posted his concerns on his Facebook page.252 The same day, Becker also
posted pictures and his own commentary of an incident at a dealership
across the street, also owned by the same owner as Knauz BMW, in which
a potential customer’s teenage son evidently drove a Land Rover into a
pond located on the property.253 Becker was subsequently fired.254
Besides Becker’s Facebook post concerning the promotional event,
the dealership’s salespeople had held in-person discussions about the food
to be served at the event, fearing it would hurt sales and, consequently,
their commissions.255 This, the ALJ concluded, constituted protected
concerted activity.256 The posting about the Land Rover incident, however,
was not protected activity because it “had no connection to any of the
employees’ terms and conditions of employment.”257 Because it was the
Land Rover posting which was the primary reason Becker was fired,258
Becker was not fired in violation of the NLRA.259
Although the ALJ did not find that Becker was unlawfully fired, he
did conclude that three provisions of the employer’s Employee Handbook
restricted employees in the exercise of their section 7 rights.260 The ALJ
paraphrased two of the provisions as “prohibit[ing] employees from
participating in interviews with, or answering inquiries concerning
employees from, practically anybody.”261 The ALJ concluded that “[i]f
employees complied with the dictates of these restrictions, they would not
be able to discuss their working conditions with union representatives,
lawyers, or Board agents.”262 A third Employee Handbook provision
stated, “[n]o one should be disrespectful or use profanity or any other
language which injures the image or reputation of the Dealership.”263 The
252. Karl Knauz Motors, Inc., No. 13-CA-46452, 2011 WL 4499437, at 1–3 (N.L.R.B.
Div.
of
Judges
Sept.
28,
2011),
available
at
http://mynlrb.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/09031d4580683b21 (pagination based on
NLRB-source document).
253. Id. at 4.
254. Id. at 4–5.
255. Id. at 2.
256. Id. at 8.
257. Id. at 9.
258. Id. at 9.
259. Id. at 9.
260. Id.at 10–11.
261. Id. at 9.
262. Id. at 10.
263. Id. at 9 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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ALJ concluded employees could reasonably interpret this provision as
curtailing their section 7 rights.264 Although the dealership had rescinded
the provisions in question prior to the ALJ hearing, the ALJ concluded
rescission alone was not sufficient—the dealership did not give assurances
to employees that in the future it will not interfere with the exercise of their
section 7 rights.265 The ALJ therefore ordered the dealership to post a
notice that it would not interfere with employees in the exercise of their
section 7 rights.266
Y. Accusing Your Employer of Improperly Withholding Payroll Taxes
Some of the employees of the Triple Play Sports Bar and Grille
(“Triple Play”) received an unpleasant surprise when they filed their 2010
state tax returns—they owed the state still more taxes.267 In February 2011,
a former Triple Play employee posted a message on her Facebook wall
about how she owed additional taxes, claiming the owners of Triple Play
could not “do the tax paperwork correctly!!!”268 Soon three current
employees and two customers joined the “conversation,” posting negative
comments about Triple Play and its owners, including a suggestion that one
of the owners pocketed the unpaid withholding taxes.269 The next day, one
of the employees who participated in the Facebook conversation—Jillian
Sanzone—was fired, in part, because her Facebook comment indicated
Two days after the Facebook conversation, another
disloyalty.270
employee, Vincent Spinella, was also fired.271 Spinella had not posted a
comment, but had used a Facebook feature to indicate that he “Liked” one
part of the conversation.272 The owners fired Spinella because by clicking
“Like,” Spinella did not have Triple Play’s best interests in mind.273
The ALJ concluded that Sanzone and Spinella were engaged in
protected concerted activity when they participated in the Facebook

264. Id. at 11. The ALJ concluded that a fourth provision—“[a] bad attitude creates a
difficult working environment and prevents the Dealership from providing quality service to
our customers,” id. at 9 (internal quotation marks omitted) would reasonably be read to
protect the relationship between the dealership and its customers, rather than to restrict the
employees’ section 7 rights. Id. at 11.
265. Id. at 11.
266. Id. at 12, 14.
267. Three D, L.L.C., No. 43-CA-12915, 2012 WL 76862, at 3 (N.L.R.B. Div. of
Judges Jan. 3, 2012), available at http://mynlrb.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/
09031d458079eae4 (pagination based on NLRB-source document).
268. Id. at 3.
269. Id. at 3–4.
270. Id. at 4.
271. Id. at 5.
272. Id. at 4.
273. Id. at 5.
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conversation: “It is beyond question that issues related to wages, including
the tax treatment of earnings, are directly related to the employment
relationship . . . .”274 The Facebook conversation “was part of a sequence
of events, including other, face-to-face employee conversations, all
concerned with employees’ complaints regarding [Triple Play’s] tax
treatment of their earnings.”275 The ALJ also concluded that Spinella’s
selecting the “Like” option “was sufficiently meaningful as to rise to the
level of concerted activity.”276
Z. Complaining About Late Paychecks
In August 2010, a number of employees at Bay Sys Technologies,
LLC began complaining in Facebook posts about delays in receiving their
paychecks, which were republished by a local newspaper.277 One of the
employees participating in the conversations was subsequently fired.278
The NLRB concluded the discharged employee, as well as the other
employees, were clearly engaged in protected concerted activity—a
conclusion made easier by the fact that the employer did not defend against
the charge.279
III.

CHANGES WROUGHT BY SOCIAL MEDIA

Three fundamental issues arise from the incidents discussed above.
First, only twelve of the incidents were determined to involve concerted
activity, and only ten were protected by the NLRA.280 The advent of
employee social media postings has not created any new bright-line test for
what constitutes protected concerted activity. Second, the NLRB is taking
a hard look at employers’ social media policies. In particular, an outright
ban on disparaging or criticizing the employer risks being considered by
the NLRB a violation of section 7. Third, the NLRB is considering the
extent to which an employer’s access to an employee’s Facebook postings
constitutes unlawful surveillance. These three considerations are discussed
next.

274. Id. at 8.
275. Id. at 8.
276. Id. at 8–9.
277. Bay Sys Techs., LLC, 357 N.L.R.B. 1 (2011).
278. Id. at 2.
279. Id.
280. See supra Parts II.B., C., E., U.1., 4., 5., 6., and 7., V., W., Y., and Z. Recall that
Kathleen Reichle’s Facebook posts complaining about a coworker were not protected
because she was not a statutory employee, see supra note 70, and Robert Becker’s Facebook
post complaining about his employer was not protected since it was not the reason he was
fired, see supra notes 252-59.
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A. Protected Concerted Activity Revisited
If anything, the above analysis of the thirty-two incidents—coupled
with the fact that nearly sixty percent of the social media charges included
in the FOIA request have been closed without further action281—establishes
that merely talking about work online does not automatically constitute
protected concerted activity. Although the Board has developed a
definition of concerted activity, it is subject to interpretation.
As noted earlier, the U.S. Supreme Court applied section 7’s
concerted activity language in NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., holding
that employees who walked off the job due to extreme cold in their work
area engaged in protected concerted activity.282 In reversing the Board’s
original decision that the employees had engaged in protected concerted
activity,283 the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that since the workers
summarily left the workplace in violation of workplace rules without
giving the employer an opportunity to address their complaint, their action
was not protected by section 7.284 The Supreme Court disagreed, holding
that employees do not “necessarily lose their right to engage in concerted
activities under § 7 merely because they do not present a specific demand
upon their employer to remedy a condition they find objectionable.”285
But what must be the context of the discussion between or among
employees? Shortly after the Supreme Court’s Washington Aluminum Co.
decision, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that in order to be
protected under section 7, a worker’s conversation “must appear at the very
least that it was engaged in with the object of initiating or inducing or
preparing for group action or that it had some relation to group action in the
interest of the employees.”286 The courts and the Board further considered
281. The number of social media-related charges identified through the FOIA request
are relatively miniscule compared to total charges filed. For example, approximately 23,500
charges were filed with the NLRB in 2010. N.L.R.B., Charges and Complaints,
http://www.nlrb.gov/charges-and-complaints (last visited May 26, 2012). However, an
argument can be made that rather than being ignorant and fearful of section 7 rights, see
Peter D. DeChiara, The Right to Know: An Argument for Informing Employees of Their
Rights Under the National Labor Relations Act, 32 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 431, 458 (1995)
(“Most likely, the vast majority of non-union employees remain ignorant of this right, or are
too fearful to exercise it.”) (footnote omitted), nonunion employees are ignorant of the scope
of their section 7 rights.
282. 370 U.S. 9, 14 (1962).
283. Wash. Aluminum Co., 126 N.L.R.B. 1410 (1960), aff’d. 370 U.S. 9 (1962).
284. NLRB v. Wash. Aluminum Co., 291 F.2d 869, 877 (4th Cir. 1961) (“[T]he purpose
of the [A]ct was not to guarantee to the employees the right to do as they please under any
given set of circumstances and in total disregard of the obligations of their employment.”).
285. Wash. Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. at 14.
286. Mushroom Transp. Co. v. NLRB, 330 F.2d 683, 685 (3d Cir. 1964).
Activity which consists of mere talk must, in order to be protected, be
talk looking toward group action. If its only purpose is to advise an

FINAL DRAFT

2012]

FACEBOOK MEETS THE NLRB

995

the contours of concerted activities in a series of decisions involving a
truck driver who was discharged after his safety complaints and his refusal
to drive an unsafe truck after reporting its condition to the Tennessee
Public Service Commission.287 The ALJ had determined the employer
violated section 7 by discharging the employee, following an interpretation
of concerted activity developed in Alleluia Cushion Co.: despite not
involving other workers, an individual employee’s safety complaints were
of vital interest to coworkers and therefore would be supported by those
coworkers.288 In Meyers I, the Board reversed its earlier approach to
concerted activity reflected in Alleluia Cushion Co., noting that the
wording of section 7 “demonstrates that the statute envisions ‘concerted’
action in terms of collective activity: the formation of or assistance to a
group, or action as a representative on behalf of a group.”289 It also
enunciated a definition of concerted activity: “to find an employee’s
activity to be ‘concerted,’ we shall require that it be engaged in with or on
the authority of other employees, and not solely by and on behalf of the
employee himself.”290
The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals reversed Meyers I, rejecting both
Alleluia Cushion Co., as well as the Board’s definition of concerted activity

individual as to what he could or should do without involving fellow
workers or union representation to protect or improve his own status or
working position, it is an individual, not a concerted, activity, and, if it
looks forward to no action at all, it is more than likely to be mere
“griping.”
Id.
287. Meyers Indus., Inc. [Meyers I], 268 N.L.R.B. 493 (1984).
288. Alleluia Cushion Co., 221 N.L.R.B. 999, 1000 (1975) (“[W]here an employee
speaks up and seeks to enforce statutory provisions relating to occupational safety designed
for the benefit of all employees, in the absence of any evidence that fellow employees
disavow such representation, we will find an implied consent thereto and deem such activity
to be concerted.”). This is known as “constructive” concerted activity. See, e.g., Terry A.
Bethel, Constructive Concerted Activity Under the NLRA: Conflicting Signals from the
Court and the Board, 59 IND. L.J. 583, 584 (1984) (stating that the NLRB has blurred the
distinction between individual and concerted action, and even purely individual action that
ostensibly benefits the group can be considered concerted action under the constructive
concerted activity doctrine). Gorman and Finkin argue that by using the term “concerted
activity,” Congress never intended to exclude individual action:
In terms of statutory construction, there are not two abstract and
distinguishable categories of action—individual action for self-interest
and collective action for mutual interest—one which Congress chose not
to protect and the other which Congress chose to protect, but rather a
continuum of individual activity—of individuals choosing to speak and
act on their own behalf, singly and in small and large groups.
Robert A. Gorman & Matthew W. Finkin, The Individual and the Requirement of
“Concert” Under the National Labor Relations Act, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 286, 344–45 (1981).
289. Meyers I, 268 N.L.R.B. at 493–94.
290. Id. at 497.
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enunciated in Meyers I.291 Specifically, the circuit court believed the Board
incorrectly assumed it was required to narrowly interpret the section 7
statutory language.292 In contrast, as noted by the Court of Appeals, the
Supreme Court had previously stated:
Although one could interpret the phrase, “to engage in concerted
activities,” to refer to a situation in which two or more employees
are working together at the same time and the same place toward
a common goal, the language of section 7 does not confine itself
to such a narrow meaning.293
Instead, regarding the nature of the relationship that must exist
between the action of the individual employee and the actions of the group
in order for section 7 to apply, it is for the Board “to resolve in light of its
expertise in labor relations, as long as its judgment [is] reasonable.”294
On remand, the Board, while acknowledging its wide latitude in
interpreting section 7,295 concluded its definition enunciated in Meyers I
was reasonable.296 In addition the Board stated, “[t]here is nothing in the
Meyers I definition that states that conduct engaged in by a single
employee at one point in time can never constitute concerted activity within
the meaning of Section 7.”297 For example, the Board explained that the
definition “encompasses those circumstances where individual employees
seek to initiate or to induce or to prepare for group action, as well as
individual employees bringing truly group complaints to the attention of
management.”298
Eleven of the thirty-two incidents discussed in this article appear fairly
clear-cut. In Reuters, the employee was reprimanded for tweeting a
comment regarding union negotiations.299 The latest NLRB Acting General
Counsel’s Memo recounts five incidents in which the General Counsel’s

291. Prill v. NLRB, 755 F.2d 941, 950 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
292. Id. at 952.
293. NLRB v. City Disposal Sys., Inc., 465 U.S. 822, 831 (1984); Prill, 755 F.2d at 951.
294. Prill, 755 F.2d at 951 (citing City Disposal Sys., Inc., 465 U.S. at 829).
295. Meyers, Indus., Inc. [Meyers II], 281 N.L.R.B. 882, 883 (1986) (“At the outset, we
reaffirm our recognition that the Board has a wide latitude in interpreting Section 7 of the
Act, as the Supreme Court has stated on numerous occasions.”).
296. Id. at 885 (“[T]he Meyers I definition strikes a reasonable balance. It is not so
broad as to create redundancy in Section 7, but expansive enough to include individual
activity that is connected to collective activity, which lies at the core of Section 7.”).
297. Id.
While Meyers I may have required more explicit authorization of
representation of a group, Meyers II implies that express authorization is not a necessary
prerequisite. B. Glenn George, Divided We Stand: Concerted Activity and the NLRA, 56
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 509, 517 n.55 (1988). But see Sharpe, supra note 5, at 208 (asserting
that after Meyers II the NLRB does not currently recognize as concerted, for example, “a
lone employee reporting company safety violations to a state agency”).
298. Meyers II, 281 N.L.R.B. at 887.
299. See supra, Part II.C. (providing details of the events that transpired in Reuters).
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office concluded employees were engaged in protected concerted
activities.300 In Hispanics United of Buffalo, the employees were fired as a
result of their online discussions, which were in reaction to a coworker’s
criticisms of the manner in which the HUB employees performed their
jobs.301 The fired employees were taking the first steps in group action
arising from accusations against them that they believed were going to be
presented to management, action they were prevented from completing
because they were fired.302 In Triple Play Sports Bar and Grille, two
employees were fired for “disloyalty” after participating in a Facebook
conversation about improper tax withholdings from their paycheck—
considered beyond question by the ALJ as concerted activity.303 Similarly
the Board also determined that employees discussing late paychecks were
clearly engaged in protected concerted activity.304 Kathleen Reichle and
her fellow nurses were engaged in concerted activity when they discussed
another nurse’s continual absenteeism.305 Finally, Robert Becker’s posting
constituted concerted activity because it summarized earlier discussions he
had with fellow salespeople regarding the possibility of lower
commissions.306
Dawnmarie Souza’s Facebook postings were more similar to Robert
Becker’s than the employees at HUB. Fellow employees who responded to
Souza’s postings mainly offered only commiseration; there was no
discussion of group action. However, the NLRB’s Office of the General
Counsel concluded her Facebook postings were protected concerted
activity because they were related to an earlier workplace incident with a

300. See supra, Parts U.1., 4., 5., 6., and 7. (citing a variety examples, ranging from
assertions of management incompetence to statements that the employees hated where they
work, in which an employee’s posts on social media sites were considered concerted action
because co-workers responded to the posts or engaged the employee in online
“conversation”).
301. Hispanics United of Buffalo, Inc., No. 3-CA-27872, 2011 WL 3894520, at 8
(N.L.R.B. Div. of Judges Sept. 2, 2011), available at http://mynlrb.nlrb.gov
/link/document.aspx/09031d4580622877 (pagination based on NLRB-source document).
302. Id. at 8–9.
303. Three D, L.L.C., No. 43-CA-12915, 2012 WL 76862 (N.L.R.B. Div. of Judges Jan.
3, 2012), available at http://mynlrb.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/09031d458079eae4.
304. See supra Part II.Z. (discussing a Bay Sys Technologies employee who was
wrongly fired for complaining about late paychecks on Facebook).
305. See supra Part II.E. (providing extensive discussion of Reichle’s case and the
position of the Board’s General Counsel). However, Reichle’s concerted activity was not
protected because she was not a statutory employee. See supra note 70 (noting that Reichle
was a supervisor and thus not an “employee” under the meaning of the Act).
306. See supra notes 252-256 and accompanying text. However, Becker’s concerted
activity was not protected since it was not the reason he was fired. See supra notes 257-259.
Recall also that in one incident, an employee’s Facebook posts were arguably protected
under section 7, but that protection was lost due to racial stereotypes and slurs contained in
the posts, which caused significant workplace disruption. See supra Part II.V.
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supervisor. The General Counsel’s office evidently considered Souza to
have been fired for an outburst related to an earlier section 7 activity.307
Yet, when Brian Morris, the Wal-Mart employee, made similar Facebook
postings following a dispute with his supervisor in response to which he
received only supportive comments from coworkers, the General Counsel’s
office concluded he was not engaged in protected concerted activity.308
The only difference between Souza’s activity and Morris’s appears to be
that Morris’s postings were not in response to his section 7 rights having
been denied by his supervisor.
Ultimately, as the majority of the incidents discussed in this Article
demonstrate, merely airing a complaint or griping about an incident at work
is not going to be protected. These incidents clearly enumerate the
elements currently required to establish protected concerted activity: (1)
online postings must relate to terms and conditions of employment;309 (2)
there must be evidence of concert—i.e., there must be discussions among
employees of the posts or coworker responses to the posts; (3) there must
be evidence the employee was seeking to induce or prepare for group
action; and (4) the posts must reflect an outgrowth of employees’ collective
concerns.310 The last three elements can be rephrased as requiring the
employee to express concerns other than his own, with evidence of an
intention to instigate group action or bring a group concern to
management.311
307. AMR Adv. Mem., supra note 23, at 9, n.16 (“It is well established that the protest
of supervisory actions is protected conduct under Section 7.”) (citing Datwyler Rubber &
Plastics, Inc., 350 N.L.R.B. 669 (2007); Groves Truck & Trailer, 281 N.L.R.B. 1194
(1986)). The Office of the General Counsel had concluded that Souza’s supervisor had
violated the NLRA by denying her union representation when she was ordered to write an
incident report. See supra note 42 and accompanying text (stating the same as well as
noting supervisor’s improper threat based on Souza’s invocation of her union rights).
308. Wal-Mart Adv. Mem., supra note 94, at *2.
309. The Board can be quite literal in this regard. See, e.g., Orchard Park Health Care
Ctr., 341 N.L.R.B. 642, 644 (2004) (deciding that a complaint by two nurses to the state
department of health alleging that the nursing home was excessively hot—while
concerted—was not protected because the complaint was made on behalf of patient welfare
rather than arising from working conditions; specifically, the nurses’ ability to deliver
patient care); Holling Press, Inc., 343 N.L.R.B. 301, 302 (2004) (deciding that one female
worker who sought the assistance of another in her sexual harassment charge against a male
supervisor was not engaged in concerted activity because she was looking out only for
herself). These cases contribute to former Board Chairwoman Wilma Liebman’s concern
that in recent years, the Board “has chosen a very confined view of ‘concerted activity’ for
the purpose of ‘mutual aid or protection,’ as protected by section 7 of the Act.” Wilma B.
Liebman, Essay, Decline and Disenchantment: Reflections on the Aging of the National
Labor Relations Board, 28 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 569, 583 (2007).
310. See, e.g., Children’s Nat’l Med. Ctr. Adv. Mem., supra note 143, at *2 (discussing
a case where the Charging Party failed to meet the criteria for concerted action).
311. See Sagepoint Fin. Adv. Mem., supra note 12, at *3 (stating individual activities
that are the logical outgrowth of the concerns expressed by the employees collectively are
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As demonstrated above, particularly exemplified by Dawnmarie
Souza,312 employees can be quite disrespectful in their postings about work
and supervisors.313 As previously discussed, an employee who is engaged
in protected concerted activity can, through “opprobrious” conduct, lose the
protection of the Act.314 Four factors are considered to determine whether
the employee will lose protection: “(1) the place of the discussion;315 (2)
the subject matter of the discussion; (3) the nature of the employee’s
outburst; and (4) whether the outburst was, in any way, provoked by an
employer’s unfair labor practice.”316 The Board has determined “that
offensive, vulgar, defamatory or opprobrious remarks uttered during the
course of protected activities will not remove activities from the Act’s

considered concerted).
312. See AMR Adv. Mem., supra note 23 (describing how Souza had referred to her
supervisor using a code for psychiatric patients and called him a “dick” and a “scumbag”).
313. See also supra note 94 and accompanying text (describing how one Wal-Mart
employee began his Facebook post with “Wuck Falmart!”); Three D, LLC, No. 43-CA12915, 2012 WL 76862, at 11 n.6 (N.L.R.B. Div. of Judges Jan. 3, 2012), available at
http://mynlrb.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/09031d458079eae4 (pagination based on NLRBsource document) (discussing an employee’s use of the word “asshole” to describe one of
the employer’s owners, and participating in a Facebook conversation in which the owner
had been referred to as a “shady little man”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
314. See supra note 45 and accompanying text (explaining the standard used to
determine whether an employee’s conduct makes it beyond the protection of the Act). Or,
as articulated by William Corbett, “The Board and the courts have developed a common law
exception to section 7 protection where the employee engages in bad faith conduct.”
Corbett, supra note 9, at 283 (citing illegal conduct as one of the exceptions).
315. The key to this first factor is whether the discussion disrupts the workplace. See
Three D, LLC, 2012 WL 76862, at 10. In Triple Play Sports Bar and Grille, customers had
participated in the Facebook conversation at issue, raising the question of whether the
presence of the customers harmed the business. Id. However, “the presence of customers
during brief episodes of impulsive behavior in the midst of otherwise protected activity is
insufficient to remove the activity from the ambit of Section 7’s protection where there is no
evidence of disruption to the customers.” Id. (citing LaGuardia Associates, LLP, d/b/a
Crowne Plaza LaGuardia, 357 N.L.R.B. No. 95, at 4 (2011); Goya Foods of Fla., 347
N.L.R.B. 1118, 1134 (2006), enforced sub nom. NLRB v. Goya Foods of Fla., 525 F.3d
1117 (11th Cir. 2008)).
316. Atlantic Steel Co., 245 N.L.R.B. 814, 816 (1979). The four factors are generally
referred to as the “Atlantic Steel factors.” In Souza’s case, her comments: took place
outside the workplace during non-work hours, addressed supervisory actions, contained no
verbal or physical threats, and were provoked by unlawful behavior by her supervisor. See
supra note 47 and accompanying text; see also Reef Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 952 F.2d 830,
837–39 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding that an employee’s sending a sarcastic letter and t-shirt to
his manager ridiculing the education level of plant employees was protected activity
because: statements on the tee-shirt and in the letter were not “fraught with malice,
obscene, violent, extreme, or wholly unjustified[;]” the activity was not highly egregious, or
ultimately highly harmful to the employer’s business; the activity related to an on-going
labor dispute and adequately related to the employee’s employment relationship; the
employee essentially intended to convey his dismay with how the employer treated its
employees; and because his activity related to terms and conditions of employment).
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protection unless they are so flagrant, violent, or extreme as to render the
individual unfit for further service.”317 But these exceptions may not be as
extreme as indicated.318
For example, in the fall of 2008, Nick Aguirre, a newly-hired car
salesman, repeatedly questioned his managers and the employer’s owner
about the size of his commissions, the lack of minimum-wage draws
against commissions, and general working conditions.319 The managers’
usual response was that if Aguirre did not like the situation he should
quit.320 Aguirre’s complaints ultimately led to a meeting among Aguirre,
the employer’s owner, and its two managers, during which Aguirre lost his
temper, berated one of the managers with a string of expletives, stood up,
pushed his chair aside, and told the owner that if he fired him, the owner
would regret it; at which point the owner then fired Aguirre.321 The ALJ
found that the employer:
had violated section 8(a)(1) several times by inviting Aguirre to
quit in response to his protected protests of working conditions.
As to the discharge, however, the ALJ applied Atlantic Steel and
concluded that, although Aguirre was engaged in protected
activity during the . . . meeting, his obscene remarks and personal
attacks on [the owner] cost him the Act’s protection.322
The Board, however, concluded Aguirre’s conduct was not so severe as to
cause him to lose statutory protection.323
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals walked through the Atlantic Steel
factors to determine whether Aguirre’s conduct removed him from NLRA
protection. The place of the discussion favored continued protection
because it was in a manager’s office, away from the workplace and it did

317. Dreis & Krump Mfg., Inc., 221 N.L.R.B. 309, 315 (1975) (citing Am. Tel. & Tel.
Co., 211 N.L.R.B. 782 (1974); Bob Henry Dodge Inc., 203 N.L.R.B. 78 (1973); Ben Pekin
Corp., 181 N.L.R.B. 1025 (1970); Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers, 383 U.S. 53
(1966)); see also Harris Corp., 269 N.L.R.B. 733, 738–39 (1984) (holding that while an
employee’s letter to management was “harsh, insubordinate, and attacked the personal
characters of members of . . . management” and was “written in a boorish, ill-bred, and
hostile tone[,]” it did not maliciously interfere with the exercise of the employer’s rights, the
employee did not engage in a clearly deliberate or malicious falsehood, and the employee
did not use language which was worse than “unkind and mannerless”) (footnote omitted).
318. See Honda of Am. Mfg., Inc., 334 N.L.R.B. 746, 749 (2001) (deciding self-made
newsletters employee distributed within the workplace which insinuated another employee
was homosexual and used an obscene play on words to refer to the employer’s bonus
program were “so offensive as to render the otherwise protected newsletters unprotected”
under section 7).
319. Plaza Auto Ctr., Inc. v. NLRB, 664 F.3d 286, 289–90 (9th Cir. 2011).
320. Id.
321. Id. at 290–91.
322. Id. at 291.
323. Id.
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not affect employee discipline.324 The subject matter of the discussion also
favored continued protection because it concerned working conditions and
Aguirre’s outburst was contemporaneous to the nature of the discussion.325
Regarding the nature of the outburst, however, the court noted the Board’s
own precedents, which recognize that an employee’s offensive and
personally denigrating remarks alone can result in loss of protection.326
The court therefore remanded the matter to the Board “to allow it to
properly consider whether the nature of Aguirre’s outburst caused him to
forfeit his protection.”327 Finally, the court agreed that Aguirre’s outburst
was provoked by the employer’s unfair labor practices.328 In sum, there is
the possibility that regardless of the other three Allied Steel factors, a
vitriolic, obscenity-laden outburst could alone deprive an employee of
section 7 protection.329 In contrast, however, opprobrious comments in the
form of racial stereotypes and slurs that cause significant workplace
disruption can also deprive an employee of section 7 protection.330
Ultimately, the Board and the courts must balance the interests of the
employer against the section 7 rights of the employee.331 As with Souza,
324. Id. at 292 (rejecting also the employer’s contention that protection should be lost
because Aguirre requested the meeting with the intent of humiliating the owner in front of
his two managers).
325. Id. at 293.
326. Id. at 293–94 (citing Care Initiatives, Inc., 321 N.L.R.B. 144, 151 (1996); Stanford
N.Y. L.L.C., 344 N.L.R.B. 558, 559 (2005); Daimler Chrysler Corp., 344 N.L.R.B. 1324,
1328–29 (2005)).
327. Id. at 294–95 (citing Trus Joist MacMillan, 341 N.L.R.B. 369, 371–72 (2004)
(concluding that the third Atlantic Steel factor alone may carry enough weight to forfeit the
Act’s protection)).
328. Id. at 295 (concluding Aguirre’s outburst was contemporaneous with both the
owner’s censure of Aguirre’s protected activities and his unfair labor practice of suggesting
that Aguirre could work elsewhere if he did not like the company’s policies).
329. But see Datwyler Rubber & Plastics, Inc., 350 N.L.R.B. 669, 670 n.5 (2007)
(agreeing in the finding that an employee’s outburst was not so opprobrious as to lose the
protection of the Act, since even “assuming arguendo the third factor (the nature of the
outburst) weighs against protection, it is outweighed by the other three factors”).
330. See supra Part II.V.
331. See Corbett, supra note 9, at 283. Also, in balancing the interests of the employer
and the rights of the employee, protected activity can lose its protection if it extends beyond
a reasonable time. See, e.g., Quietflex Mfg. Co., 344 N.L.R.B. 1055, 1058–59 (2005)
(holding “that employees are entitled to persist in their protest for a reasonable period of
time, after which the employer is entitled to assert its rights as to its entire premises[;]” and
finding that the twelve-hour duration of the employees’ action was unreasonable,
particularly in view of the employer’s attempts to respond to their concerns); see generally
Sam Heldman & Hilary E. Ball, Quietflex Manufacturing and the Unpredictable Case-byCase Balancing of Section 7 Rights: “Liberty Finds no Refuge in a Jurisprudence of
Doubt,” 22 LAB. LAW. 97 (2006) (critiquing the “Quietflex rule” as not changing the law but
raising doubt as to what the law is); Amy J. Zdravecky, “If I Only ‘Had a Brain’ . . . I Could
Figure Out the Contours of Concerted Activity Versus Other Competing Rights”: Quietflex
Manufacturing and Its Ten-Factor Balancing Act for Determining How Long a Protected
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though, that balance will almost always fall in favor of the employee with
the acknowledgement that “time outside working hours, whether before or
after work, or during luncheon or rest periods, is an employee’s time to use
as he wishes without unreasonable restraint . . . .”332 However, outside
conduct does not automatically retain section 7 protection that may
otherwise be present. For example, posting on Facebook, regarding recent
earthquakes in the area, the employee’s desire for the employer’s building
to collapse while certain members of management were inside of the
building will generally exempt an employee from section 7 protection.333
In addition to illegal activity, deliberate lies will usually take an
employee outside of protection.334 As discussed earlier, the NLRB’s Office
of the General Counsel concluded an employee’s Facebook post suggesting
her employer was engaged in fraud was not protected once the employee
refused to remove the post after being informed of convincing evidence
that fraudulent conduct had not occurred.335
B. Social Media Policies
As discussed previously, social media policies which may reasonably
be interpreted to chill protected concerted activity will be considered
unlawful.336 While an outright ban on section 7 activities would clearly
violate section 8(a)(1),337 it is not always clear which types of prohibited
Concerted Work Stoppage Can Continue on the Employer’s Premises, 22 LAB. LAW. 69
(2006) (discussing the ten circumstances that will determine at what point a protected
concerted work stoppage becomes unreasonable so as to lose its protection under the
NLRA).
332. Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 803 n.10 (1945) (quoting Peyton
Packing Co., 49 N.L.R.B. 828, 843 (1943)); see Morris, supra note 10, at 1708.
333. See Dismissal of Charges Letter from Ronald Hooks, Reg’l Dir., NLRB, No. 26CA-24000 (June 30, 2011), available at http://mynlrb.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx
/09031d4580520e25 (discussing dismissal of charges); see also supra Part II.V. (describing
loss of section 7 protection due to posting comments containing racial stereotypes and slurs
that caused significant workplace disruption).
334. See, e.g., NLRB v. N.Y. Univ. Med. Ctr., 702 F.2d 284, 291 (2d Cir. 1983)
(explaining that “[e]rroneous assertions lose their protected status only when they are
published with knowledge of their falsity or with reckless disregard of whether they were
true or false.”) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Linn v. United Plant Guard
Workers, Local 114, 383 U.S. 53, 65 (1966) (applying specifically to employee protected
activity under section 7)).
335. See supra Part II.Q.; see also, United Cable Tel. Corp., 92 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 3, 9
(1998) (Koven, Arb.) (determining that an employee who posted a letter on a union bulletin
board which called the employer’s vice president a liar did not engage in protected
concerted activity because his motive was to “revivify and exacerbate the antagonism that
had previously been the controlling feature of the relationship” between the employer and
the union prior to a “détente”).
336. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
337. See, e.g., Flagler Hosp. Adv. Mem., supra note 68, at *2 (explaining that “a rule is
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communications may or may not chill section 7 activities. For example,
banning disparagement alone does not necessarily restrict section 7
activity.338 As noted by the General Counsel’s office, “cases in which rules
could not reasonably be construed to cover protected activity involved
situations in which the rules clarified their scope by including examples of
clearly illegal or unprotected conduct and/or there was no evidence that the
rules were applied against protected activity.”339 For example, in Fiesta
Hotel Corp., a rule forbidding employees from engaging in “any type of
conduct, which is or has the effect of being injurious, offensive,
threatening, intimidating, coercing, or interfering with fellow Team
Members or patrons”340 was found not to be unlawful because the
prohibited conduct was not “inherently entwined with Section 7 activity[,]”
nor was its “terms so amorphous that reasonable employees would be
incapable of grasping the expectation that they comport themselves with
general notions of civility and decorum in the workplace.”341 Similarly, in
an Advice Memorandum, the Office of the General Counsel concluded that
Sears Holdings’ social media policy, which included a prohibition against
“[d]isparagement of company’s or competitors’ products, services,
executive leadership, employees, strategy, and business prospects[,]”342 was
not unlawful because the policy itself “covers a list of proscribed activities,

unlawful if it explicitly restricts Section 7 activities”).
338. See, e.g., Flagler Hosp. Adv. Mem., supra note 68, at *2 (noting that a rule can
implicitly restrict section 7 activities if one of three conditions is met: “(1) employees
would reasonably construe the language to prohibit Section 7 activity; (2) the rule was
promulgated in response to union activity; or (3) the rule has been applied to restrict the
exercise of Section 7 rights”) (citing Lutheran Heritage Vill.-Livonia, 343 N.L.R.B. 646,
647 (2004)).
339. Flagler Hosp. Adv. Mem., supra note 68, at *3; see also Acting General Counsel’s
Adv. Mem., supra note 190, at 17 (concluding that an employer’s social media policy that
required employees to confine their social networking to matters unrelated to the company
was lawful because the overall context, including specific examples listed by the employer,
would reasonably be construed by employees to address only communications that could
implicate securities regulations).
340. Fiesta Hotel Corp., 344 N.L.R.B. 1363, 1367 (2005) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
341. Id. at 1368. But see Hills & Dales General Hosp., No. 07-CA-53556, 2012 WL
542765
(N.L.R.B.
Div.
of
Judges
Feb.
17,
2012),
available
at
http://mynlrb.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/09031d4580854c07 (concluding that Values and
Standards of Behavior policies which prohibited negative comments about fellow
employees, including managers, and engaging in or listening to negativity or gossip were
overly broad as they could reasonable be construed as prohibiting protected activity; while a
policy that requested employees to represent the employer in the community in a positive
and professional manner was not considered unlawful).
342. Advice Memorandum from the NLRB Office of the Gen. Counsel to Martin O.
Osthus, Regional Director of Region 18, Sears Holdings (Roebucks), No. 18-CA-19081,
2009 WL 5593880, at *2 (Dec. 4, 2009) [hereinafter Sears Adv. Mem.], available at
http://mynlrb.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/09031d45802d802f.
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the vast majority of which are clearly not protected by Section 7.”343 As
such, taken as a whole, as in Tradesmen International, the Policy contains
sufficient examples and explanation of purpose for a reasonable employee
to understand that it prohibits the online sharing of confidential intellectual
property or egregiously inappropriate language and not section 7 protected
complaints about the Employer or working conditions.344 In contrast,
AMR’s Blogging and Internet Posting policy, which stated that
“[e]mployees are prohibited from making disparaging, discriminatory or
defamatory comments when discussing the Company or the employee’s
superiors, co-workers and/or competitors,”345 was considered unlawful
because it contained “no limiting language to inform employees that it [did]
not apply to Section 7 activity.”346
When the NLRB’s Office of the General Counsel or an ALJ has found
potentially protected concerted activity, they are much more inclined to
address social media policies, versus policies in place when no concerted
activity is involved. In Flagler Hospital, where the Charging Party
evidently engaged in protected concerted activity but for her status as a
supervisor,347 the General Counsel’s office recommended the NLRB
Regional Office issue a complaint arising from the Hospital’s social media
policy.348 In Karl Knauz Motors, Inc., in which Robert Becker engaged in
concerted activity but was not dismissed because of that activity,349 the ALJ
found portions of the employer’s social media policy to be unlawful and
ordered remedial action—even though the employer had rescinded those
policies prior to the ALJ hearing.350 In the incident involving the employee

343. Sears Adv. Mem., supra note 342, at *3.
344. Sears Adv. Mem., supra note 342, at *3. But see William R. Corbett, The
Narrowing of the National Labor Relations Act: Maintaining Workplace Decorum and
Avoiding Liability, 27 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 23, 47 (2006) (reviewing Board
decisions applying workplace rules of decorum and civility, concluding that the Board is
narrowing employees’ section 7 rights, particularly for nonunion employees).
345. AMR Adv. Mem., supra note 23, at 5.
346. AMR Adv. Mem. supra note 23, at 14. But see Three D, LLC, No. 43-CA-12915,
2012 WL 76862, at 20 (N.L.R.B. Div. of Judges Jan. 3, 2012), available at
http://mynlrb.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/09031d458079eae4 (pagination based on NLRBsource document) (concluding that an employer’s Internet/Blogging Policy—which stated
that “employees may be ‘subject to disciplinary action’ for ‘engaging in inappropriate
discussions about the company, management, and/or co-workers’”—was not unlawful
because it was directed toward maintaining the company’s reputation with respect to the
general public) (citing Tradesmen Int’l, 338 N.L.R.B. 460, 460–61 (2002); Ark Las Vegas
Rest. Corp., 335 N.L.R.B. 1284, 1291–92 (2001); Flamingo Hilton-Laughlin, 330 N.L.R.B.
287, 288–89 (1999)).
347. See supra note 70.
348. Flagler Hosp. Adv. Mem., supra note 68, at *3.
349. See supra Part II.X.
350. See supra notes 260–266 and accompanying text.
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who used an obscenity as his job title in a LinkedIn profile,351 the NLRB’s
Office of the General Counsel addressed the employer’s electronic
Communications Usage policy, which:
forbids material that is “obscene[,] defamatory, harassing or
abusive” to any person or entity associated with the company.
We note that the inclusion of the word “harassing” arguably
could be construed to preclude protected online content, since
such a broad term would commonly apply to protected criticism
of the employer’s labor policies, and the Board has consistently
stated that discipline imposed under an unlawfully overbroad rule
violates the Act.352
However, since the LinkedIn “joke” was not considered concerted, there
was no violation of the NLRA when the employee was fired for violating
the policy.353
The Board has recently formally articulated its stance on overbroad
rules:
[D]iscipline imposed pursuant to an unlawfully overbroad rule
violates the Act in those situations in which an employee violated
the rule by (1) engaging in protected conduct or (2) engaging in
conduct that otherwise implicates the concerns underlying
Section 7 of the Act. Nevertheless, an employer will avoid
liability for discipline imposed pursuant to an overbroad rule if it
can establish that the employee’s conduct actually interfered with
the employee’s own work or that of other employees or otherwise
actually interfered with the employer’s operations, and that the
interference, rather than the violation of the rule, was the reason
for the discipline.354
In other words, if an employee is disciplined for engaging in protected
concerted activity through a social media policy containing one or more
overbroad rules, the Board will take action against the employer based on
its policy.355 If an employee is disciplined for engaging in unprotected
concerted activity through a social media policy containing one or more
overbroad rules, the Board will still take action against the employer based
on its policy in order to minimize the chilling effect of the policy.356
Finally, if an employee is disciplined for engaging in activity outside the
gambit of section 7—fundamentally unconcerted activity—through a social
351. See supra Part II.N.
352. Schulte, Roth & Zabel Adv. Mem., supra note 130, at *1 n.1.
353. Schulte, Roth & Zabel Adv. Mem., supra note 130, at *1.
354. Cont’l Grp., Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. No. 39, 2011 WL 3510489, at *6 (Aug. 11, 2011)
(“It is the employer’s burden . . . to establish that the employee’s interference with
production or operations was the actual reason for the discipline.”).
355. See, e.g., supra Part II.B.
356. See, e.g., supra Part II.X.; see also notes 76–77 and accompanying text..
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media policy containing one or more overbroad rules, the Board will not
take action against the employer based on its policy as long as the employer
can establish the employee’s conduct interfered with the workplace and the
employee was not disciplined solely because of the overbroad policy.357
In the Board’s opinion, this approach minimizes the likelihood of a
chilling effect on employees’ section 7 rights by properly acknowledging
the employer’s legitimate interests while simultaneously discouraging posthoc rationalization of disciplinary decisions.358 Once again, the Board is
“balancing . . . employees’ Section 7 rights and employers’ legitimate
interest in establishing work rules for the purpose maintaining discipline
and production.”359
One final aspect of communications policies is that the Board will
evidently not consider informal policies unlawful. For example, Brian
Pedersen, the Arizona Daily Star reporter, was verbally instructed to not air
his grievances or comment about the employer-newspaper in any public
forum,360 and ultimately told not to tweet about anything work-related.361
The NLRB’s Office of the General Counsel concluded “those statements
did not constitute orally-promulgated, overbroad ‘rules[;]’ . . . the
statements were made solely to the Charging Party in the context of
discipline, and in response to specific inappropriate conduct, and were not
communicated to any other employees or proclaimed as new ‘rules.’”362
357. See, e.g., supra Parts II.K. and N.; see generally supra Part II.D.
358. See Cont’l Grp., Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. at *6 (concluding that the rule formulated in
the holding “reflects a deliberate balancing of employees’ Section 7 rights and employers’
legitimate interest in establishing work rules for the purpose [of] maintaining discipline and
production”).
359. Id.; see supra note 331 and accompanying text (noting that the court may balance
the interests of the employer and the rights of the employee). But see Corbett, supra note
344, at 47 (concluding that recent Board decisions have “elevate[d] employers’ desires to
avoid liability under other laws and to ensure civility and decorum in the workplace and
subordinate[d] the rights of workers to engage in protected concerted activity for mutual aid
or protection”).
360. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
361. Daily Star Adv. Mem., supra note 59, at *5.
362. Daily Star Adv. Mem., supra note 59, at *7; see also Salon/Spa at Boro, Inc., No.
9-CA-45349, 2010 WL 5099879, at 24 (N.L.R.B. Div. of Judges Oct. 18, 2010), available
at http://mynlrb.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/09031d45803b97a9 (finding that an older
employer’s verbal warnings to younger employees not to post comments critical of the
business on Facebook to be less about the work environment and more about “life in
general”) (internal quotation marks omitted) (pagination based on NLRB-source document).
It is clear to me that [the employer’s] overall purpose in warning her
employees to be careful in their use of social networking media was
didactic, not coercive. Thus, her references to the potential negative
effects of the exercise of poor judgment when using the sites did not
represent a threat of reprisal from management but rather a warning that
poorly chosen statements or photographs could have a negative impact
on a young person’s reputation with resulting impact on her career.
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C. Unlawful Surveillance
As noted in a few of the incidents described in Part II., employees
have accused their employers of unlawful surveillance.363 In particular,
does a supervisor’s knowledge of the contents of an employee’s Facebook
postings create an impression of surveillance? As a general matter, absent
a legitimate justification, employers are prohibited from engaging in
surveillance, as it tends to chill employees’ freedom to exercise their rights
under the NLRA.364 This includes surveillance of protected activity taking
place during non-work time.365 Although discussing union activities, the
Board has ruled that “the test for determining whether an employer has
created an impression of surveillance is whether the employee would
reasonably assume from the statement that their union activities had been
placed under surveillance.”366 The Board explained:
The idea behind finding “an impression of surveillance” as a
violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act is that employees should
be free to participate in union organizing campaigns without the
fear that members of management are peering over their
shoulders, taking note of who is involved in union activities, and
in what particular ways.367

Id. On May 30, 2012, the NLRB’s Acting General Counsel released a report in which his
office reviewed seven employer social media policies, finding six of them to be unlawful.
Memorandum from Lafe Solomon, Acting Gen. Counsel, NLRB to All Regional Directors,
Officers-in-Charge, and Resident Officers, Report of the Acting General Counsel
Concerning
Social
Media
Cases
(May
30,
2012),
available
at
http://mynlrb.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/09031d4580a375cd. This latest report provides
further guidance from the office of the General Counsel on what is and is not permissible in
social media policies.
363. See supra Parts II.A., J., and S. (discussing examples of the application the
elements of unlawful surveillance in nonunion settings).
364. See Calif. Acrylic Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 150 F.3d 1095, 1099 (9th Cir. 1998)
(holding that employers violate section 8(a)(1) if employers engage in activities that chill
their employees’ freedom to exercise section 7 rights); Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc.,
302 F.3d 868, 884 (9th Cir. 2002) (determining that employer surveillance often causes
employees to refrain from exercising their rights under federal labor law due to a fear of
reprisal).
365. Charles B. Craver, Privacy Issues Affecting Employers, Employees, and Labor
Organizations, 66 LA. L. REV. 1057, 1068 (2006).
366. Flexsteel Indus., Inc., 311 N.L.R.B. 257, 257 (1993).
367. Id. In an unreported decision, the Board determined there was no unlawful
surveillance when a supervisor viewed a picture of employee union organizers on a union
website, considering it analogous to “merely observing open union activity.” Magna Int’l,
Inc., No. 7-CA-43093(1), 2001 WL 1603861 (N.L.R.B. Mar. 9, 2001). However, when the
supervisor mentioned to one of the employees that he had seen her in the picture, “he was
conveying the impression that he was keeping track of her union activities and thus was
creating the impression of surveillance” in violation of section 8(a)(1). Id. (citing Fred’k
Wallace & Sons, Inc., 331 N.L.R.B. 914, 915 (2000) (deciding that “unlawful impression of
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Stated another way, an employer can create an unlawful impression of
surveillance when it “reveals specific information about protected activity
that is not generally known and does not reveal its source.”368 However,
Facebook itself can add an extra dimension to this analysis. For example,
in Public Service Credit Union, the employer’s HR Vice President, who
obtained a copy of the Charging Party’s Facebook posts, did not reveal
which employee was his source.369 However, the NLRB’s Office of the
General Counsel concluded the employer did not engage in unlawful
surveillance because the Charging Party had restricted access to his posts to
only his Facebook “friends;” therefore, “he could not have reasonably
concluded that the Employer was directly monitoring his Facebook
page[,]” and could only conclude “that the Employer learned of his
Facebook activity from his Facebook friends.”370
There is no impression of surveillance when the employer informs
employees it has obtained the content of online postings and conversations
from coworkers or customers,371 or when the employee has “invited” a
supervisor to view Facebook postings by “friending” the supervisor.372
Depending on one’s Facebook privacy settings, however, friends of friends
may be able to see one’s postings—so a supervisor may be able to see an
employee’s postings even if the employee did not “friend” the supervisor,
if the supervisor has friended a friend of the employee. Arguably, the
knowledge that a supervisor is Facebook friends with some employees
surveillance” was not created by supervisors merely observing union activities, but by
supervisors making clear to an employee they were taking particular note of them);
Flexsteel Indus., Inc., 311 N.L.R.B. at 257) (noting that an employer may create an
impression of surveillance, which constitutes an unlawful interference with section 7
rights)). As revealed in the earlier discussion of incidents, the elements for unlawful
surveillance have been applied in nonunion settings. See supra Parts II.A., J., and S.
(discussing examples of the application of the elements of unlawful surveillance in
nonunion settings).
368. Intermountain Adv. Mem., supra note 173, at *5.
369. Public Service Credit Union Adv. Mem., supra note 137, at *4.
370. Public Service Credit Union Adv. Mem., supra note 137, at *4. (internal quotation
marks omitted). See also MONOC Adv. Mem., supra note 31, at *6 (concluding that
accepting information from one employee regarding the online activity of another employee
does not constitute monitoring); Frontier Tel. of Rochester, Inc., 344 N.L.R.B. 1270, 1276
(2005), enforced sub nom. Frontier Tel. of Rochester, Inc. v. NLRB, 181 F. App’x 85 (2d
Cir. 2006) (determining that the employer did not engage in unlawful surveillance by not
revealing who had sent copies of postings on a secure website because “a reasonable
employee would assume that [the employer] lawfully learned of [his] message exactly the
way [the employer] did—through public dissemination by another website subscriber”).
371. See MONOC Adv. Mem., supra note 31, at *3 (“[N]o impression of surveillance is
created where the employer explains that it obtained the information from another
employees, particularly in the absence of evidence that the employer solicited the
information.”).
372. See supra note 110 and accompanying text (noting that because the employee
“friended” his supervisor, the supervisor could not be said to have engaged in surveillance).
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could chill work-related discussions on Facebook. Like Facebook, Twitter
tweets will be public unless the user expressly selects to “protect” her
tweets.373 If a Twitter user keeps her tweets public, she will not know who
is “following” her—in other words, receiving a copy of her tweets—unless
she actively manages her account by identifying followers and potentially
blocking them from receiving her tweets. Without diligence, a Twitter user
could therefore be sending tweets to management without even knowing
it—just as a Facebook user’s posts may be available to a manager who is a
friend of a friend. These are issues raised by newer technology that have
yet to be directly addressed by the Board.374
What is unknown is whether the Board would consider a manager’s
access to Facebook posts through friend-of-a-friend status to be equivalent
to the Charging Party’s Facebook friend giving copies of the posts to the
manager. Though, arguably, friend-of-a-friend status implies monitoring,
whereas monitoring is generally considered absent when the employer has
received copies of Facebook posts by an employee’s Facebook friend.
Similarly, will a tweeting employee have an obligation to monitor
followers to weed out management? Again, electing to follow an
employee’s tweets implies monitoring. Friend-of-a-friend status or
following tweets implies the employer is not merely observing employee
activities, but making particular note of them.375
Ultimately, is the best advice to employees to limit Facebook posts to
friends only and to not make tweets public—fundamentally crippling the
social attributes that have made Facebook and Twitter so popular and so
dear to their hundreds of millions of users? In the alternative, if employees
choose to not heavily restrict access to their posts and tweets, are they then
allowing their protected activities to be potentially chilled?376 The balance
between these two options has yet to be resolved.

373. About Public and Protected Tweets, TWITTER.COM, https://support.twitter.com/
articles/14016-about-public-and-protected-tweets (last visited May 26, 2012).
374. See generally, Jeffery M. Hirsch, The Silicon Bullet: Will the Internet Kill the
NLRA?, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 262 (2008) (arguing that the Board’s failure to adapt to
evolving communications technologies, including the Internet, could result in the NLRA
losing its relevancy).
375. See generally, supra note 367 (noting that unlawful surveillance may occur in a
nonunion setting, which would include Facebook or twitter surveillance).
376. See generally, Jeffery M. Hirsch, Communication Breakdown: Reviving the Role of
Discourse in the Regulation of Employee Collective Action, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1091
(2011) (addressing the potential of communications technologies, which could facilitate and
enhance concerted activities, to actually thwart such activities, from the perspective of
workplace communications in light of the Board’s decision in The Guard Publ’g Co., 351
N.L.R.B. 1110 (2007), enforced in part, enforcement denied in part, 571 F.3d 53 (D.C. Cir.
2009)).
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CONCLUDING ANALYSIS
As the above discussion implies, the fact that employees are using
Facebook and other social media tools to discuss work does not alter the
basic analysis of what does and does not constitute protected concerted
activity. If the majority of social media-related NLRB charges filed by
employees against their employers are any indication, most work-related
online postings are merely gripes. They are complaints about fellow
workers or managers that do not involve a call to action; they do not
express a collective concern that has been or will soon be brought to the
attention of management. In the alternative, if employee online posts do
constitute concerted activity, they will not lose their protection merely
because they are rude or disrespectful. They will not lose protection unless
they are extremely vitriolic, threaten harm, or otherwise disrupt the
workplace.
In the meantime, employers are learning that overly broad social
media bans can run afoul of the NLRA. While employers can risk
maintaining overly broad policies as long as they respect employee section
7 rights, the Board will take action if it appears an employee was dismissed
through such a policy after engaging in concerted activity, protected or not.
So far, the main focus has been on policies that ban disparagement of the
employer’s business or its managers, as often complaining about working
conditions can result in disparaging remarks. As such, the NLRB has
clearly signaled that without specificity—making clear that concerted
activities are not included—an employer’s policy against disparagement
may be unlawful. The NLRB has also made clear that a “savings clause”—
an overly broad prohibition ending with a disclaimer it will not be applied
against concerted activities—will not save the employer.377
Finally, the unique sharing aspects of social media—particularly
Facebook—can raise surveillance issues that have yet to be directly
addressed by the Board. It is clear that no impression of unlawful
surveillance is created when the employer is provided copies of an
employee’s Facebook posts or tweets by a friend or follower of the
employee. And, at least initially, to “Friend” a supervisor on Facebook is
tantamount to inviting the supervisor to view the employee’s posts. But
how voluntary would such a “Friend” request be? Would it be reasonable
for the employee to be concerned there could be negative repercussions,
however indirect, if the employee refused a supervisor’s friend request or
later “unfriended” the supervisor?378 Similarly, without taking affirmative
377. See, e.g., supra note 82 and accompany text, and note 209.
378. See, e.g., Pietrylo v. Hillstone Rest. Grp., No. 06-5754 (FSH), 2008 WL 6085437,
at *1 (D.N.J. July 25, 2008) (involving a restaurant waitress who provided access
information to management for a secure MySpace account not because she was “explicitly
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steps to restrict access to Facebook posts or Twitter tweets, there is always
the possibility of a friend-of-a-friend or following supervisor lurking in
cyberspace. Clearly, supervisors who, through their own efforts, gain
access to posts and tweets to potentially track employee communications
raise the specter of chilling concerted activities through unlawful
surveillance.

threatened with any adverse employment action,” but because she was afraid she would get
in trouble with management if she did not).

